Gewirth

Gewirth writes: “since an absolute right is one that is valid without any exceptions, it may be concluded either that no rights are absolute because all involve some specification or that all rights are equally absolute because once their specifications are admitted they are entirely valid without any further exceptions” (95). As such, he is saying that too much specification can make all rights absolute (because their narrowness does not allow for exception) or a complete lack of specification can make no rights valid (because they would be so broad).

To compensate for this specification problem, Gewirth posits three criteria. He argues that any specification must be “recognizable to ordinary practical thinking,” be “justifiable through a valid moral principle,” and must “exclude any reference to the prissily disastrous consequences of fulfilling the right” (95-96). I feel like these criteria are a form of written sleight-of-hand. Gewirth explains what the three criteria mean, but he does not specify (at least that I could find) any reason why they are the exact criteria that need to be used. It seems to me that he is choosing criteria (absent justification) that allow him to make the argument he is trying to formulate.

The right he goes on to defend throughout the article, “a mother’s right not to be tortured to death by her own son” is, it seems to me, a product of this specialization (98). He is not defending a right to life, a right not to be killed by one’s kin, a right not to be killed, a right not to be tortured, or a right not to be tortured to death by one’s kin; rather, Gewirth is defending a seemingly very specific right. It seems to me that Gewirth is falling into his own trap of defending a right that is so specialized that it is absolute. Now, I know that the right could be made more specialized, and such specialization would (probably) make the right easier to defend. I’m also aware that the right he chooses to defend does require quite a bit to text to justify. Still, I’m left wondering if the specialization of this example right leads to Gewirth’s ability to make his argument.

I know that, at the end of the article, Gewirth expands the right to include other individuals, but I’m wondering if there are other rights that could be defended as absolute rights. Is Gewirth’s logic limited to torture, or does his argument encompass other types of rights?