Dworkin

Rights as trumps? Sounds like a card game we'll see...

Scanlon

So while in class yesterday I was thinking that the right to abortion is the perfect example of what he addresses in this article. Although I may personally never want to have one I still want the right to be able to make this choice. I think that's what he is saying, rights are all about the ability to choose and make choices that leads to control over our own lives. I wasn't sure how the right to life fit into this idea so I had to reread the last section. It makes sense now it seems that it's not so much about saying I have a right to life so you have a duty not to kill me, a claim. It seemed more about our choices and that no one but me can have the option to end my life if I am in control over my own life. I also have the ability to choose if I want to put my life in jeopardy to save anothers. I may have missed the point but that's what I got. Comments?

Dworkin

"Political preferences, like the Nazi's preference, are on the same level-purport to occupy the same space-as the utilitarian theory itself. Therefore, though the utilitarian theory must be neutral between personal preferences like the preference for push-pin and poetry, as a matter of theory of justice, it cannot, without contradiction, be neutral between itself and Nazism." (157)

Why does Dworkin make this distinction? What if the people truly believe that having a Nazi form of government will create the most pleasure, will they be utilitarian or Nazi? As I understand Dworkin, util. and Nazism are on the same level, and Nazism is not solely a preferance (although in this case it would be). Maybe I am misunderstanding utilitarianism.
Also, on page 156 he talks about intensity of preferences, and how that is a way to measure what will be prioritized. How is this equality, if one's desires count more than others?

On page 166, Dworkin writes "We need rights, as a distinct element in political theory...community's general welfare lies." Why is he saying that rights are necesssary for the minorities whose interests will be overlooked to promote the greatest good, if he believes that utilitarianism does not have to take into account all preferences?

'equal consideration'

This reading while being shorter than others, was dense in meaning. There was one passage that caught my mind's eye in particular. When discussing how utilitarianism could combat the claim that utilitarianism does not give enough weight to distributive considerations (pg 141). One answer utilitarianism could give is to give priority to those individuals interest that are 'most urgent'. The problem I have with this is that what is most urgent is entirely circumstantial and subjective. Even if we could get past these two large problems we still are left with the sheer problem of logistically doing what is 'most urgent'. Lastly, I feel murky about what the author's intent of this piece was and seek others thoughts?

Scanlon

I'm in with Ernie on this one, in that, I found myself reading sections going "ok I understand this" and then Scanlon switches to something else, and I'm thinking "ok I understand this too" but I just don't understand how it all ties together. I see that he is trying to get away from strict utilitarianism by accomodating rights through what may be called rule-utilitarianism, and I see the different considerations that he is going through, but is that the big picture? I'm not sure.

I did appreciate the larger points on rights, in general, such as what should be considered, and what are the consequences of certain things, and what are the values in others. For example, on page 141, when discussing the consequences and their values, he states, "A theory that respects autonomy will be one that assigns all these factors their proper weight," and then goes on to talk about the proper weight through fairness and equality. He proposes an "equality of distributions" and "fairness of processes" which of course there are questions with both terms 'fairness' and 'equality' as to what they mean and what the proper distribution is, etc... He states that fairness and equality are "morally desirable" but can also have costs, but the costs are difficult to determine, as well.

It is also ambiguous to me when he states that the main concern of most rights is the promotion and maintenance "of an acceptable distribution of control over important factors in our lives" (148). I'm not sure if he is saying that this is what rights ought to be concerned with or if that's the way he views rights as currently being.

So is he claiming that one can be a utilitarian and still have justification for actions, without using the moral standpoint? Also that current the normative utilitarian view is obscure and is very hard to defend. Is he claiming that the principle of consideration, if correctly applied can work to justify a utilitarian view? And once this principle is followed, “equality of distributions and fairness of processes are among the properties that make states of affairs worth promoting.” The state will be able to achieve max utility by allowing certain exceptions, such as the scenario he uses for times of drought. In a drought if the pump house is burning it would be okay to use the water to put it out, even though it would be breaking the law?

Perhaps the most intriguing question for me is why Scanlon might choose to engage in this endeavor. I think most people would agree (though not to every detail) that the way we generally conceive of ethics--either only evaluating the ends or the means--is lacking. We know that, most of the time, we are comfortable arguing for the most utilitarian outcome; none of us, however, is comfortable with the prospect of losing the organ lottery. Scanlon makes some interesting in-roads to the middle. With the middle, of course, always comes the fear that we will always default to what is utilitarian--I'm not sure I understand how Scanlon gets around this problem, but I get that he's, to some extent, attempting to accomplish just this.

I like the idea of thinking of rights as the "parcelling out of valued forms of discretion." This makes sense particularly in light of the discussion in section IV. It would probably be rational to consent to a system in which our organs would be divided up and given to others; we are uncomfortable with this notion because it seems to violate consent if decided without our agreement. I also think its interesting that its possible that the deontology might rest on utilitarian ideas--we create particular rules with the believe that it will lead to certain consequences which are valued. Much of the debate, then, is over which consequences are more valuable.

One more distinction I found useful was made on 147. Unlike rule utilitarianism, his theory is more concerned with avoidance of major violations. That being said, we can set aside rules (and adopt new ones) if doing so is likely to maximize utility. He is, in light of our discussion of Lyons, NOT concerned merely with incremental utilitarian gains; overriding rights requires something major.

To be honest, I understood a number of individual parts of this article better than the overall picture.

Scanlon

Consequentialist- Theory that human actions derive their moral worth solely from their outcomes or consequences. In the book, it was act-consequentialist. I was wondering what the difference was. I also do not understand what conservatism and mistrust have to do with utilitarianism. On page 145 About Dudley looking at his situation, it can be seen two ways: A way of constraining individual decisions and a way of parceling out valued forms of discretion.

Scanlon

I, like Erma, do not understand the inclusion of section IV (Life and Death). I think it is interesting, but I fail to see how it fits into the larger argument about rule utilitarianism and rights.

I really appreciated Scanlon’s discussion of majoritarianism and rights on pages 140-141. He writes: “On a subjective theory, these values will be determined by the existing individual preferences in the society in question. I would maintain, however, that prevailing preferences are not an adequate basis for the justification of rights” (140). In other words, Scanlon argues that the will of the majority may not be the best way to justify a right. I’ve thought (and I’m not sure if this was prompted by something else we read this semester or just my own wandering thoughts) that rights, to some extent, must be countermajoritarian because they protect a sphere of one’s life from interference by another. In that manner, it seems like rights act as a shield to protect us from majority tyranny. If our protection from the tyranny of the majority is grounded in the preferences in the majority, it would seem that rights are worthless.

I think that this critique of majoritarianism runs implicitly throughout parts of the article, and it comes back again in full force when he writes the following: “On the view I propose, a central concern of most rights is the promotion and maintenance of an acceptable distribution of control over important factors in our lives” (148). In other words, Scanlon’s view of rights is dependent upon the idea that rights allow individuals to maintain control over certain aspects of their lives; rights allow individuals areas of solace from the whims of the majority.

I also appreciated the care he devoted to the discussion of equality on page 143. Until we discussed equality as a contested concept in a political theory class last semester, I had never stopped to think that what is equal may not be the same to every person. For example, if we were to divide a cake amongst members of the class, how do we determine what is an equal and fair portion? I think his three points on 143 helped me to gain a more structured way to think about equality and distributions.

Scanlon

Scanlon begins by addressing the issue that util. has with accomodating rights. He claims that social utility cannot be justification for overriding moral rights, but they do need justification. Further, it is important not to focus on specific individual cases, but on general rules. He does not that this harms the theory itself. Giving an individual claim or liberty rights diminishes the rights of another individual (140). Why is this necessarily negative? Isn't that the point of having a right, so that another cannot infringe on your freedom?

"They must base themselves on a general claim about how importants interests they seek to protect are for any person as compared with the interests served by conflicting claims." (140)
Does this mean that interest of the right holder and others have to be weiged? If this is so, it seems that it would defeat the purpose of that right.
Scanlon further goes on to address the importance of individual autonomy, and that it leads to
rights, liberties and other means to shape their place in society.

I really like the part about justice and equality. Having unequal distribution of wealth gives those in power more ability to control the lives of the less fortunate. Their individual autonomy is therefore in jeopardy. He argues that to minimize this inequality, we should close the gap between the rich and poor, not distribute wealth equally to both ends of the spectrum.

The following is something that I do not understand:
"They differ from the ends promoted in standard utilitarian theories in that their value does not rest on their being good things for particular individuals: fairness and equality do not represent ways in which individuals may be better off." (143)
I understand utilitarianism to be concerned with the greatest good for most. How is fairness and equality not that? Also, util. wants the most good, and fairness and equality bring good..

On page 147, he claims that "rights concern the alleviation of certain major problems". What might these be? I cannot help but to think of genocide in regards to the right to life, or torture. I would like to see what others think about this claim.

(I believe) that he is claiming that there are no absolute rights, and even so, the value of having a right is what is important (149).

Lastly, I understood (and enjoyed) Section IV about LIFE AND DEATH, but I am confused as how it ties to the rest of the article. I would appreciate insight.

Again...

Well I will start with MANY questions I had.

What does normative mean? He used that word a lot, and I checked the dictionary but it was not very helpful (Why do they use the word itself in the definition?)

On page 125, Lyons claims that justified rules have legal impact, and that impact has a moral force. How is this so?

On page 126, there is a discussion about Mary's rights and the official's thinking. I am confused weather Mary's rights were set by utilitarian principals, and therefore, the utilitarian offical should allow for them?

*At the beggining of the article, we are told that it is impossible to accomodate rights in the util. system. After reading the article, I still do not understand why this is so. I guess I don't get the big picture. Please help.

Lyons and Me

I was absent from class today, and this post is coming late. I read the article over the weekend, but I really struggled with it. Before I go on and post my thoughts, would someone please be kind to e-mail me notes from today? I would be forever greatful :)

Morality or lack of

I think that what he is trying to say in this article or what he stresses as a flaw in utilitarianism is the fact that they ignore or don't acknowledge the moral side of rights. He feels that moral consideration is needed and what is best for the greatest amount of people can sometimes be over-ridden by moral reasoning but there is no room for this in a utilitairian frame and I think that is what he is asking us to change. I liked his ideas about abosolute rights and I agree that we do not have abosolute rights because what might make them absolute today may not be relevant tomarrow, and nothing is guarenteed. Also In response to the last post I think that he is simply using "welfare" as a way to say what is good for the community or the most number of people within it.

utilitarianism and moral rights?

Lyons makes an important distinction about the question the argument pertains to on page 124 saying, "our question is not whether utilitarianism or efficiency analysis could regard such institutions as justified or morally defensible. Our question is what significance such a theorist must attach to that fact when it comes to evaluating conduct in the context of those rules; for example, in determining how an official in such a system should behave".

I'm struggling with the term "human welfare" and how it is applied in a utilitarian sense. Lyons concludes "the aim of promoting some value like human welfare is as relevant to individual acts as it is to social institutions; the later application does not rule out the former. But unless utilitarianism is restricted, its direct application to conduct undermines respect for the very rights it wishes to endorse" (pg 136).

After re-reading this conclusion and thinking more about 'how an official in such a system should behave' that I feel a bit confused. Would such an official choose an action he was ordered to do if he felt that it did not maximize the overall human welfare even though the institution he belongs to was said to promote the overall human welfare?

Utility & Rights

[I think] what Lyons is saying is that utilitarian reasons for justifying rights are different than moral reasons or "moral force" for justifying rights, and because many of our rights are conceptualized under a moral framework, or a legal one grounded on moral rights, it becomes difficult to explain rights within the utilitarian framework. Further, it becomes difficult because we have certain rights whether or not they increase utility. The part that I, like Ernie, struggled with, is the discussion about utilitarian considerations "within limits" and the different thresholds he discusses. He states, "Let us suppose that very substantial utilities or disutilities outweigh the moral force of Mary's rights. We cannot infer from this that minimal increments of utility are sufficient to outweight those arguments" (120). He puts focus on the italicized phrases but doesn't really explain what they entail.

On 115 Lyons is talking about how rights are not absolute, but exist as thresholds. It seems like the argument he makes is that utilitarians want to promote welfare, even if it is only by a small amount. Lyons argues for rights because tiny increases in welfare aren’t enough to outweigh a right.
He talks about morally neutral rights, and how just because a legal right exists doesn’t mean it is more. On the other hand in the Bentham section he talks about how rights can legally exist but not matter because they are not enforced. I don’t feel like I understand the full scope of his argument here though.
I think it becomes clearer on 120 when his says about Mary and that “her rights make a difference to the evaluation of her and others’ conduct , a difference that unrestricted utilitarian reasoning cannot accept”. He also says “from the mere fact that net utility would be maximized by encroaching on her rights, we cannot infer that one is justified in encroaching on them.”(120)

Lyons

Lyons is arguing that utilitarianism cannot successfully accommodate for the ‘moral force of justified legal rights’, if one takes the moral force out of the justification for rights? I am confused because he seems to be using moral force for and against utility. Although he says utilitarianism ignores moral force, but one needs to accept this justification to be able to make claims about rights? On page 120 he writes, “in the present context, the difference amounts to this: from the mere fact that net utility would not be maximized by her exercising her rights, we cannot infer that her exercise of them is not justified; similarly, from the mere fact that net utility would be maximized by encroaching on her rights, we cannot infer that one is justified in encroaching on them.” I think he is saying that to have legal rights and claim that some are morally defensible is necessary for utility. And rights are put into place because they are promoting maximum utility even though in individual situations it may not seem like it. This article was difficult to follow and piece everything together for me.

Lyons

I, like Mike, struggled to understand exactly what Lyons is saying on 118. I understand (I think) his overall general argument but, upon reading that passage, failed to understand how it connects up with what I think he's saying and what the syllabus indicates hes saying. Perhaps this indicates that his argument is more complex than I think it is. Maybe I'm just thinking about that paragraph too much. I also, admittedly, got lost in some of his answers to why rule utility would overcome his objections--as far as I can tell he makes a distinction between the institution and the actors within the institution and that differentiates it or something. He also argues on 130 that any overarching rules would either be counter-utilitarian or would have to be overridden.

I have only one major question about this section. I understand his argument that utility would require us to override rights that were not utilitarian (Cameron's comment on Mike's post sums this up really well). What I don't understand completely is how he can argue for limited utility considerations (120). It makes sense to me; of course there are some situations in which it intuitively makes sense to allow for utility to be the overriding principle, but we wouldn't want to always act in favor of the most utilitarian option. He italicizes the words within limits--why is this a legitimate move to make? What is the line at which utility becomes the primary consideration? In what ways can we legitimately establish this point? I'm not doubting that it can be done, I'm just not sure he ever establishes such a point here--or, to think of it in another way, how utility factors in to be compared with other factors. To what extent must we account for utility? Where do we draw the line?

Lyons

I have a couple of questions that occurred to me as I was reading Lyons.

Lyons writes: “The principal assumption I shall make is this. When we regard Mary’s rights as morally defensible, on any basis whatsoever, we also regard them as having moral force. The differences that her rights make to evaluation of conduct obtain, not just in the eyes of the law, but also from a moral point of view” (118). I’m not sure I understand what he means by this. Is he saying that whenever we defend a right on the grounds of morality we grant some amount of force to that right? In other words, is he asserting that the action of defending a right based on morals gives that right some sort of moral power? Also, I am not sure what that last sentence means. I’m not sure what is being “obtained” in the sentence.

On another note, I was having a difficult time understanding the Moral Rights Exclusion Thesis until I reread his explanation on page 115. His example about the right to life helped me to understand why utilitarians often dislike moral rights. The example helped me to see the potential conflict that could exist when one individual makes a decision to protect her own right while at the same time taking an action that could decrease overall utility. But, that leads me to another question. Why does this not apply to legal rights as well? Isn’t it also possible that an individual could take an action to preserve his own legal right while simultaneously taking an action that decreases overall utility? I’m unsure why this exclusion applies to one type of right but not the other.

Response to Jasmine

This would not post in your "comments".

Also, what really helped was when she said that you can't torture your mom, but you can't just sit and chill either. You have to do something to aleviate the situation. How I understood, our only absolute right is that we not be tortured. At least, that's what he addressed. :)

Absolute?

So I left class today feeling a little confused it seems to me that he has not proven that we have absolute rights. He talks about the right not to be tourtured but he believes that you must tourture your mother in the terrorist example, is this because we are not to be held responsible according to his second principle of intervention? To me this is just a moral justification which would fit in with the override idea but dosn't that point to the right not being absolute because there is no moral justification for violation of an absolute right? Absolute when it can not be overridden dosn't seem to fit this example of tourture to me. The only thing I can think of that is absolute was Prof. example of being able to think what you want to think. Maybe I missed something could someone help me out.

Are There any Absolute Rights?

I found the definitions right at the beginning very helpful. Fulfilled-when required action is performed or prohibited action is not performed. Infringed-when required action is not performed or prohibited action is preformed. Violated-unjustifiably infringed. Overridden-justifiably infringed. Absolute-when it cannot be overridden.

Absolute Rights?

The idea of absolute rights is a highly contestable subject. The argument put forth by Gewirth in his essay is well-thought out and highly logical. All other points aside, the one absolute right he claims exists, that "all innocent persons have an absolute right not to be made the intended victims of a homicidal project." In thinking about this idea, I have tried to formulate an exception to this "absolute rule." (Although, I want to note that I believe absolute rights exist before pursuing proving Gewirth's theory wrong.)
Suppose you take an individual working at a gas station. The gas station is robbed, and in the process the clerk is shot and mortally wounded. The clerk, prior to death, was a convicted sex offender. Now, while this is an extreme example consider this: The clerk had committed no offense to cause the sudden resignation of his life during the situation at the gas station; however, many would argue the clerk forfeited his right to life/innocence at the point he had committed his prior bad acts. While he was innocent of the intended homicidal project he was forced to partake in, had the clerk forfeited his right to life through other means?
Another possibility involving cultural difference: Say a man is killed during a suicide bombing in the Middle East as part of a holy jihad against "foreign invaders/entities." Now, those conducting and orchestrating the bombings would say the man indeed was innocent of the homicidal project, but he was present in the area at the time so he was an intended victim. His sacrifice of life for the greater good, though, was one that gained him greater status in the afterlife (ESPECIALLY because he was not the target of the attack). In that mindset, the death can be justified as necessary and non-absolutist regarding Gerwiths rule, and the man's innocence was not violated due to the man's choice to enter the area at said time. For such a scenario, the idea of chance must be considered. Now, of course, many would argue that in this case Gerwith's argument still holds true for this man.
While the latter argument is not as coherent as I like, it gets me to my main point. The problem for me, at least, comes in our interpretations of innocence regarding intended victims. At best, we must define innocence, or at least clarify at what point our choices remove our innocence. In order to maintain a degree of absolutism, this clarification must also be universal. However, I wouldn't presume this to be possible.
Hopefully the above conept(s) are totally incomprehensible or too scattered for understanding...

Gewirth

When he talks about the Rule of Absolutism, he says that “it is at this level that one asks whether the right to life of all persons or of all innocent persons is absolute.” And that this raises the problem of exceptions. And concludes that either, no rights are absolute because they all involve some specifications or that all rights are equally absolute because once their specifications are allowed they are entirely valid. But then he goes on to say that there are certain types of specification that do not debar it from being absolute. What? Why does he claim that there are no specifications to absolute rights and then say that, well there are three specifications that are specifications, but they don’t count as specifications? His arguments for absolute rights seem to get caught up in a number of places. One of the biggest problems and he addresses it once in the text, is that he uses a hypothetical situation. Is that what is referring to when he talks about abstract? Why not use a situation like, A will happen if B is not completed. Instead of using, A might still happen even if B is completed.

I see the overall point he is trying to make but, don’t see how everything fits together to make his point. Such as Cameron has pointed out that this seems to be another right which cannot stand by itself. Because for one, it seems that there are exceptions to this right and if there are exceptions isn’t one thing about this right, is the fact that it is absolute?

A Right at the End of the Tunnel

Okay, what Gewirth treats as the difference between a concrete absolutist and an abstract absolutist I call wussing out. It sort of defeats the point of a thought experiment to be like "oh! hey! maybe there are other options!" in order to make your conscience feel better about letting lots of people die. The rest of the article I found really interesting and well reasoned, but this part I think is silly.

My biggest concern here, as one trying to learn about ethics and rights, is why the distinctions that Gewirth draws between...excuses?...matter. Much as he challenges the distinction between direct and oblique intention, I am quick to question the distinction between that argument and the intervening action argument. One argument says that he didn't directly intend to do it (but it was a forseeable consequence), the other argument says that it was someone else's fault. I don't understand why one couldn't foresee the circumstances under both arguments and thus be obligated to choose to save more people. I'm rambling...I understand why the arguments are different, but the distinction just seems unimportant to me. I am not convinced that this justifies the right being absolute. I could be convinced that this puts a person in a situation so difficult that they couldn't be morally blamed either way, but I don't understand why this makes the right absolute.

I, like Mike and Cameron, am a little skeptical about how specific the original right he discuss is. It makes me wonder, again, what exactly a "right" is. He says he's talking about claim rights--but how valuable is it to speak of rights this specific? It seems like we should be able to defend broader claims, though I do find his explanation for it reasonably compelling.

I looked it up briefly, but can we discuss more the Principle of Generic Consistency?

Principles in Gewirth

Principles in Gewirth

There were of couple of principles mention in the Gewirth’s essay that I hope we can discuss further in class. These principles sparked an interest in me as being important to understand. Please feel free to question my interpretation of these principles.

First of all, Gewirth, and what Erma already pointed out, points out his definition of an absolute right on page 92, “A right is absolute when it cannot be overridden in any circumstances, so that it can never be justifiably infringed and it must be fulfilled without any exceptions.” At the same time, Gewirth has argues that there are circumstance where rights have to overridden for a relative standard, either for the sake of the well being the one person or many persons. To come to this conclusion, he uses Abram’s situation.
Aside from this point, Gewirth mentions about 5 principles to discuss further about our rights.
· Principle of Generic Consistency
· Principle Absolutism
· Individual Absolutism
· Rule Absolutism
· Principle of the Intervening Action

In a sense, I see that the Principle of Generic Consistency is no different from Kant’s theory that states, “One must act of that in which could be universal law” (or something very close to that).
Page 93 defines PGC: “this principle of every agent that he act in accord with the generic rights of his recipient as well as of himself.” This principle could be the closest reason to believe that we do have absolute rights, which are rights that we, as human beings want and must applies and consider that people want to. In additional, the PGC, and other theories such as the Golden Rule, Kant’s theory, and Principle of Utility, falls under the category of Principle Absolution, which according this: “what is absolute, and thus always valid and never overridden, is only some moral principle of a very high degree of generality which, referring to the subject, the respondents, and especially the object of rights in a relatively undifferentiated way (94).”

Individual Absolutism suggest that a individual has a absolute right to something in a particular place and time “when all grounds for overriding the right in the particular case has been overcome” (94). This principle is a little confuse, however, I think it suggest that a person can overriding anyone else right to something when it is necessary to in a situation, such as Abram’s situation. Where Abram had to violate his mother's right not to be torture. While, the Rule Absolutism principle suggest something neutral than what both Principle and individual Absolution suggests. To my understand, this principle suggest that a absolute right is define after considering the circumstance and the individual involve, which therefore must act upon either through a Principle Absolute perceptive or a utilitarianism perceptive.

Lastly, the principle of the intervening action is interesting theory that caught my attention. The principle suggest, to me, that violations of someone’s right does, not always and only, rely upon one person, by upon the third party, which is involve and committing the violation itself. The terrorist in Abram’s story are the perfect example. I don’t think it is fair to that someone violate someone else’s rights, at the same time, hand down or force someone else to handle the responsibility of fulfilling the duty of the person’s rights that has been violated. Then, again anyone’s right to life means that we have a duty not to take it and/or prevent the person from being taken. By this standard, we must do what is necessary to preserve someone’s life. However, it is absurd to have this responsibility when someone else is violating a person’s right to life and expect to give the responsibility to someone else. In to what account does the third party, who commit the violation of right, not responsible for his/her action?!

Gewirth

Gewirth writes: “since an absolute right is one that is valid without any exceptions, it may be concluded either that no rights are absolute because all involve some specification or that all rights are equally absolute because once their specifications are admitted they are entirely valid without any further exceptions” (95). As such, he is saying that too much specification can make all rights absolute (because their narrowness does not allow for exception) or a complete lack of specification can make no rights valid (because they would be so broad).

To compensate for this specification problem, Gewirth posits three criteria. He argues that any specification must be “recognizable to ordinary practical thinking,” be “justifiable through a valid moral principle,” and must “exclude any reference to the prissily disastrous consequences of fulfilling the right” (95-96). I feel like these criteria are a form of written sleight-of-hand. Gewirth explains what the three criteria mean, but he does not specify (at least that I could find) any reason why they are the exact criteria that need to be used. It seems to me that he is choosing criteria (absent justification) that allow him to make the argument he is trying to formulate.

The right he goes on to defend throughout the article, “a mother’s right not to be tortured to death by her own son” is, it seems to me, a product of this specialization (98). He is not defending a right to life, a right not to be killed by one’s kin, a right not to be killed, a right not to be tortured, or a right not to be tortured to death by one’s kin; rather, Gewirth is defending a seemingly very specific right. It seems to me that Gewirth is falling into his own trap of defending a right that is so specialized that it is absolute. Now, I know that the right could be made more specialized, and such specialization would (probably) make the right easier to defend. I’m also aware that the right he chooses to defend does require quite a bit to text to justify. Still, I’m left wondering if the specialization of this example right leads to Gewirth’s ability to make his argument.

I know that, at the end of the article, Gewirth expands the right to include other individuals, but I’m wondering if there are other rights that could be defended as absolute rights. Is Gewirth’s logic limited to torture, or does his argument encompass other types of rights?

Gewirth

At the beggining of his essay, Gewirth takes into account that there are many disputes regarding the absolutism of rights, and he addresses the arguements. The right to life is one of the most important and studies ones. Gewirth claims that "A right is absolute when it cannot be overriden in any circumstances, so that it can never be justifiably infinged and it must be fulfilled without any exceptions." (92).

After showing the example of the son's torture of his mother, he claims that the only right that is absoulte is one that protects innocent persons from being made into intended victims of a homicidial project. Although I do understand how he came to this conclusion, I am confused about this being the only right. Did I perhaps just misread or skip over another one?

Further, I do not understand why does this right have to be so specific to be absolute. Is that what gives it the possibility to have that trait? Would a general right be more easily broken, therefore, not have the possiblity of absolutism?

On page 102, Gewirth uses Abram's example to explain the importance of intention. He says that "When Abrams refrains from torturing his mother to death, he does not directly intend the many ensuing deaths...Hence he is not morally responsible for those deaths." I am understanding intent as a condition for absolute rights. Although those innocent people died, since Abrams intent was not to kill them he is not responsible. The guilt falls on the terrorists that had intervening action.

Prima Facie Right

The most interesting part about Gregory Vlastos’s essay was his discussion on Prima Facie Rights on page 47. Now, after looking up the definition of the word “prima facie,” which defines the word as “at first view; at the first appearance”, I see how Vlastos’s view of rights. In a related note, another source defines the word as “what at first seems to be true, until later proven wrong.” This makes sense to me that any right that we, as human being, declare does seem true; therefore it becomes true until it is proven wrong by moral reasons. It is easy to declare a right is a right that a person should have and in a sense, it would seems true for a human being for the sake of securing his/her well being. It can, then, be argued by another person, who thinks the right is wrong or right, to declare that the right to something is wrong or right by using reason. Therefore, to me, this all ties in with the notion that it takes at least two people to create a right. One, of course, has to declare a right, while the other either agree or disagree to accept the right of the individual. I don’t think one person can declare a right, to either restrict someone or make another fulfill a duty to the person, is even possible since no one is around to fulfill it.

Vlastos-Justice and Equality

Ernie states that he doesn't believe that moral obligations are seperable from merit. Vlastos goes on to argue with this, sort of. "His offence against the law does not put him outside the law" (55). He is saying that even though a man is wrong or does wrong things doesn't mean that he has the right to be treated poorly. This seems to go against what the golden rule is, 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you'. Therefore, if one person is mean or immoral to you they are only to expect the same thing back.
This is one of the main points that I thought about after I read the previous posts. One other thing I understood was part three when he describes when an action is just or not. This was a difficult article to understand the meaning to but I got through it with many questions left to ask.

Vlastos

I think that Prof. McCrickerd's response to Mike pretty well sums up the article; I only have a few comments as of now.

1.) I'm not convinced entirely by his argument on 55 that our moral responses are independent of the merit of another. Do we really feel it to be true that we ought to save a man from drowning regardless of his moral merit? Dahmer? Hitler? It sounds callous, but I'm not sure I believe that moral obligations are completely seperable from merit. Perhaps another example: Am I obligated to recognize the right to freedom of movement to someone who has been convicted of murder? This seems to be a discussion of character. Then again, his argument for why natural rights can be overridden could explain this away.

2.) What is the larger take home point? I understand that it justifies overriding equality based on merit, but what other situations would this apply to? He talks about how it might apply to the economic and political sphere. In what ways?

3.) I think perhaps most important is what he points out on page 74. Recognizing where distinctions are justifies also helps us figure out when they are not. Merit and human worth are two distinct concepts. Inequal action based on merit does not justify claiming inequality in human worth.

Practical Implications

Vlastos states in regard to MP in section IV, “Since merit is unequal, to justify MP is to justify unequal rights in respect of praise. Because persons have equal rights to well-being and to freedom, then, in the special circumstances of distributing praise for merit their right to this particular good is unequal.” I understand this and how he concludes this in respect to MP being unequal and how MP enhances production and let’s one express their freedom in their own way according to their own desires. But he goes on to talk about practical implications for MP, and this is where I get confused with a couple of them. I may have missed something in the reading dealing with these, but I just do not see how they connect. He says that we may justly distribute praise unequally according to merit, this one I understand, the entire essay is concerned with this. But the next practical implication he says is, it tells us what we may not do; How so? And it warns us against confusing merit for human worth which I can see. If one is praising the “human” and not the “action” one can be seen as superior. But the last one he says, it’s against allowing merit to swamp human worth, what does this mean?

Vlastos

Vlastos begins section II of his article with the following: “Let me begin with the first on my list of maxims of distributive justice: ‘To each according to his need.’ Since needs are often unequal, this looks like a precept of unequal distribution. But this is wrong. It is in fact the most perfect form of equal distribution” (49). After reading the summary on the syllabus, I knew that such a point was the thesis of his essay, but I was really wondering how he would prove it because the thesis seemed almost nonsensical to me. I had always thought that human rights, given to all humans by nature of their humanness, required absolutely equal treatment. But, as I started thinking about equality (and read his New York police example), I started to realize that there are two different conceptions of equality at work. First, one can consider equality as the equal distribution of resources (the police officers’ time in Vlastos’s example). Second, one can conceptualize equality as the intended result of the action (working to give all citizens an equal right to security). So I think Vlastos is saying that inequality (in the first sense) is justified to preserve equality (in the second sense). Particularly, he writes (regarding the perceptions of the Martian visitor): “for then he would have seen at once that unequal distribution of resources would be required to equalize benefits in cases of unequal need” (51). Is this what he is saying to justify inequality, or am I so caught up on one particular example that I’m missing the bigger picture?

General and special rights

For the most part I felt as though I comprehended and could see the logic behind Hart's conception of a right on an individual basis. I understood that at the core, Hart was arguing that one has a right to something if by one's choice one determines how another will act, thus limiting their freedom of choice.

The notion that rights depend of the relationship between individuals as formed by the exercise of their free will makes sense to me. Where Hart lost me a bit was when he was talking about general rights, which didn't seem to follow the logic used for the rest of the article. Since Hart says that "general rights do not arise out of any special relationship or transaction between men," (88) how does he argue to convince us of their existence at all?

Are there any natural rights?- Hart

In her discussion of the connection between moral and legal rights, Hart states that, “the most important common characteristic of this group of moral concepts [i.e. justice, fairness, rights, and obligation] is that there is no incongruity, but a special congruity in the use of force or the threat of force to secure that what is just or fair or someone’s rights to be done shall in fact be done; or it is in just these circumstances that coercion of another human being is legitimate” (p.80). I understand Hart’s discussion of special rights and moral justification, but I don’t understand this quote. How is it that moral concepts such as justice and fairness allow the use of force or the threat of force to attain said concepts? Perhaps Hart is using force to signify legal measures, but if the word force is being used with the connotation that I am understanding, I am not sure that I agree with that statement.

Secondly, I agree with her that moral rights and duties need not necessarily be correlative and that it is important to differentiate between a right and between codes of behavior that merely prescribe actions. Perhaps the lack of this differentiation is what is contributing to the proliferation of rights that Wellman discusses.

Hart

In the early part of his essay, Hart asserts that “it is still important to remember that there may be codes of conduct quite properly termed moral codes… which do not employ the notion of a right, and there is nothing contradictory or otherwise absurd in a code or morality consisting wholly of prescriptions or in a code which prescribed only what should be done for the realization of happiness or some ideal of personal perfection” (78). In other words, Hart implies two things with this statement. First, any particular code of conduct does not necessarily imply a moral right; simply because an individual’s moral code would lead that individual to perform or not to perform a task does not mean that a right exists. Second, even if that code of conduct is based upon morals (I separate a code of conduct and a moral code of conduct because I can see codes of conduct—such as those that are required by employers—that are not necessarily based upon morals), such moral actions may not imply the existence of a right. Thus, Hart asserts that the existence of certain codes of conduct or moral beliefs does not necessarily imply the existence of a right.
I think that Hart’s claim is helpful to the conversations we have been having in class about the qualifications for the existence of a moral right. It seems to me like we have been wondering at what point a moral belief is transformed into a moral right. Hart’s assertion here provides a partial answer to our question; although we do not know the point at which such moral beliefs are transformed into moral rights (if such a point does, indeed, exist), Hart helps us to understand that not every moral right is necessarily implied by a particular code of conduct or moral code. As such, just because an individual or group of individuals holds a particular belief does not necessarily mean that their belief is a right.
I suppose this makes sense; we know from Wellman that many moral rights are “alleged” moral rights—some people may assert them but they do not actually exist. So, Hart’s claim that beliefs do not necessarily imply a moral right seems to be similar to Wellman’s notion of the existence of “alleged” moral rights.
So, I have the following question: have MacDonald, Hart, or Wellman argued as to the existence of a point at which a moral right vests? In other words, have we read a claim of a particular “tipping point” when a moral belief does imply a moral right?

Natural Rights

Hart talks about giving up a persons rights and how the only way that X is responsible and has "control" over Y's actions is if Y surrenders his rights. Does that mean that a mother has "control" over making decisions for her infant if the infant has surrendered his rights to his mother? How would a mother know if an infant has surrendered his rights if the infant can't translate that? This was something I thought about while reading this writing. I believe that an infant can't have rights because he doesn't understand what a right is, therefore the mother should be responsible to make choices for or watch over the infant. But how could the infant surrender his rights, because that is the only way that the mother has "control" over her infant. What would happen if an adult who doesn't have the mental capacity to understand rights an has someone else watching over them? Does that mean that the person watching them has the "right" to make choices in the mentally handicapped adults life? I think Hart would say that the mentally handicapped adult wouldn't have these rights because they have to be able to make the choice or decision to surrender these rights. This would also apply to infants because they don't have the mentally ability to surrender or understand the rights that they may or may not have. This was one thing I thought a lot about because we have been discussing whether infants/babies and animals have rights.

Hart

Cameron I think your right on in saying that Hart is not nessacarly recognizing anything else as a natural right except the right to freedom. I thought this was a really cool article I can see Hart's point and his analysis brings "natural rights" in to a new light. I liked the way he tied promise making, obligations (spoken or moral), and personal commitments all back to one thing, The right to freedom. Although his writing was a bit complex by the time I got done reading I was thinking, yea, a simple explination to natural rights. What a good arguement.

Natural Rights

When reading others post and after reading MacDonalds article I see alot of questions of if we even have natural rights. I took her arguement to say yes we do have these rights they are part of who we are as man or human. On page 27 she says, "He cannot lose them without losing himself." The thing that I believe that is up for question is if we have the ability to claim these rights and this is where reason comes into play. "To the extent natural rights, or the ability to claim natural rights, depends on the reason. But it does not follow from this that reason alone constitutes the specific nature of man or that the worth of human beings is determined solely by thier IQ's. Reason is only one human excellence(29)." This is why we are able to isolate ourselves from society and do whats right in cases such as slavery or abortion, however, are reasoning can later be questioned and does not define us as man or human.

HArt is awesome

In this article Hart is arguing that if we have any rights at all it is the equal right to freedom. This argument hinges on the understanding that all other rights and obligations which are asserted are used as justification to limit an individuals freedom. He explains this in showing that rights are invoked in 2 ways either; to assert that no one has justification for stopping an individual for acting in a specific way, or to assert that someone behave in a certain way.
Hart chooses in this article to not address the concept of moral value of actions but instead to examine the concept of what he calls our special rights. These special rights are rights that are asserted because we have freely bound ourselves to something by virtue of some deal with another individual. These types of rights range from simple promise keeping, to agreeing to take care of the other person's grandmother, or an agree among a group that they each have a right to say what they want. In this capacity these rights can be looked at as special rights(and in some cases basic rights maybe)which means that what is binding the individuals freedom is his freely given consent to behave/allow others to behave in a specific manner. What Hart finds important to clarify here is that just because one benefits from anothers obligation in a special right does not mean she is the right holder. The right holder is only the one that made the deal with the one who has the obligation. He does not in this article try and address the ethical nature of any act which someone may be bound to, but this does not mean it doesn't concern him. He states that one may find that he is morally bound to do X but X is also found to be a bad act. In this case you simply choose the best option of the two.
To clarify where he gets his stance that promise keeping is a right: I dont think he is really asserting that it or anything other than our equal freedom is a right. He is saying that if we believe in any rights other than the equal right to freedom then we must also at least believe that we all have an equal right to freedom. This is because any other right that we may believe is a right that is used to justify the limitation of an individuals freedom. By needing to justify the limitation we are showing that it must be a right. He is not making any claim here that these other rights he talks about are in fact rights. At least I think that is what he is saying.

Justification and Promises

As his opening statements point out that if we have any moral rights we have a natural right to be free. And we have this ‘natural’ right if we are capable of choice and this right is not created such as moral rights are. One thing that I found interesting is that if we have moral rights we have a natural right to be free, yet when we create moral rights one important feature he feels needs to be there is a moral justification for it because it will limit the rights of other people. It either requires a duty toward someone to act or a duty to restrain someone from acting. He then goes on to talk about how this moral justification needs to be of a certain kind to make it a right, such as, if one has a justification to act or if someone has no justification and is acting. It seems like a lot of this is based on judgment of individuals. Like when he talks about breaking a moral obligation in the next part of his essay.

Such as promises and how we have a moral obligation to the promisor to keep that promise, the trouble im having in this is why it is a “moral” obligation. It may be the wrong thing to do for some people to break a promise but he goes onto say that “reflection may show that it would be in the circumstances be wrong to keep this promise because of the suffering it might cause.”(86) How does one determine which promises one should keep? How can one accurately determine what the lesser of the two evils is? And which one will cause the least amount of suffering?

Natural Rights

My thoughts

What caught my attention in MacDonald’s essay was the part where she talks about natural law and the law of gravity in page 25. She quotes, “natural law applies impartially to all men in all circumstances, as the law of gravitation applies to all bodies.” Which to me, this means that the idea that law of gravity applies to all of us implies that since a law of nature applies to us all, then by nature, we have natural laws that creates natural rights for all human beings. These natural rights are positives rights that gives us the idea and right to have a life, liberty, freedom, and pursuit of happiness or so I believe.

Another interesting quote that MacDonald points out in her essay is:

The nature of man determines his ‘natural’ rights. And since, though not accidental, it also seemed to be a matter of fact that men exist and are rational, rights claimed on account of this fact seemed also to be natural and to follow from the essence of man, even though they might be denied. (27)

This quote made me start thinking about how we, as human beings, always creating meaning to signs and symbols. It is a fact that we do exist, this may be a simple way of putting this; we natural create meaning and create our own rights. Since we exist, we might as well create a meaning to live and to our actions, regardless if it is being denied by others.

Natural Rights - MacDonald

Rachel asks a lot of interesting questions that have also been bothering me, or making me uneasy, for the past few weeks – mainly how do we know we have natural rights? One of the answers is that these rights are a standard as set by nature. But, ‘set by nature’ is an ambiguous phrase. For example, MacDonald refers to arguments about natural rights being conceived as a fact. At the risk of sounding like a five year old, I have to ask – but why? One of my favorite quotes from this piece is, “This standard [that is, that every man has rights] was not determined by men, but by nature, or, sometimes, by God. It was fact and not fancy” (24). This initially made sense to me because I had a feeling, although not a clear way of articulating it, that rights precede laws, and only through our development as human beings in societies have we realized those rights that we have had all along and attempted to capture them in more concrete laws governing societies. So, to say that these rights have existed and we have only over time been able to recognize them, could in a sense be seen as this conception of natural rights as granted to us by some source.

But one could still question natural rights as being set by nature, or by God. What exactly does it mean that something is determined by nature? When I think of things being determined by nature I think of physics and laws of relativity and such, which we view as facts. Also, including the word ‘God’ in our dialogue can be problematic because it does not account for atheists. MacDonald clarifies these conceptions of natural rights by taking a stance and saying that “Assertions about natural rights then are assertions of what ought to be as the result of human choice” (34). But this is also problematic, as MacDonald points out, because values cannot be proven, they are not facts, but rather judgments. In this way, laws and the conception of rights changes with the values of society. This, I think, answers Mike’s question about the fluidity of rights. I think that rights are fluid, in the sense that as society changes and as values change, we make different decisions about which rights we ought to have. And Ryan, I do not think that you are off in relating this to the proliferation of rights. As we decide or realize different rights, it makes sense that we would want a legal backing to such rights or even a moral backing, because it grants us a justification or purpose on which to rest our claims.

As a bit of a side note, I couldn’t help but notice MacDonald’s use of the word “man” repeatedly in her piece, as well as the word “negro.” Both were startling to me, not because I am unaware that rights rhetoric has generally focused on the term “man,” but because I cannot decipher whether MacDonald is using it in that sense to convey that that’s how rights have been conceptualized by society for many years, or if she is using it for other purposes? Clearly, saying that men have rights is not the same as saying that human beings have rights. In the same regard, the word “negro” struck me because of obvious reasons. Here, also, I could not decide whether MacDonald used that particular word to convey a social status, similar to the “artificial status” of being a slave, that she discusses in her piece, which has been constructed by society because laws are imperfect, or if she was using it for another effect?

Natural Rights as defined by us?

"in short, 'natural rights' are the conditions of a good society. But what those conditions are is not given by nature or mystically bound up with the essence of man and his inevitable goal, but is determined by human decisions" (pg 34).

I found this passage in particular to be of great significance because it sums up a lot of what Macdonald is arguing in the article. Moreover, I personally find the concept of natural rights as being artificial to defeat the entire purpose of calling them natural rights, why not contemporary value rights? I guess my problem is how I have come over my years of defining natural rights. By natural rights I always thought in an objective manner i.e. natural rights were independent of human volition, not contingent upon them. I'm curious as to what others think about this concept. I still somewhat believe that there may very well be objective natural rights. It may vary well be the case that we may never know these rights, but that does not mean they do not exist and that we should not attempt to discover them. I know that there are strong arguments against the case of objective natural rights, one being that "standards are determined by human choice, not set by nature independently of men" (pg 31). Nevertheless, part of me still thinks about natural rights as something that is unchanging. Perhaps the name 'natural rights' should be replaced with a better phrase that more accurately represents the true nature of these rights. Or perhaps I am finding it hard to replace my, at times dogmatic, definition of what a natural right is.

MacDonald's Essay

MacDonald points out that throughout history, regardless of particular political creed (except, of course, in tyrannical or fascist governments, &c), we find appeals to the equality of man (an equality which is untempered by asterisks and qualifiers). This is often based on some sort of essential human nature which the Greeks (Aristotle) tell us is reason, or the capacity for abstraction. Thus, MacDonald explains, many philosophers have claimed that the human capacity for reason is the grounding for our natural rights/natural law. MacDonald goes on to assert, however, that the capacity for reason varies from person to person, and that the lack of reason does not mean that these individuals lack natural rights. So, if it isn't the capacity for reason, what is it? Here I felt like I ended up stumbling around a bit, fumbling in the dark. I read her as saying that humanity, without any qualifiers, gives us natural rights, almost as if she was saying that natural rights are wrapped up in the very fabric/essence of our humanity (and I suppose I am taking part in a tautology, but it still seems very complicated to me). She looks at human difference, and she asks, "But where in this variety are we to find the constant factor by which to determine human rights? What passport will admit to the Kingdom of Ends?" (29). She goes on to say that "nature provides no standards or ideals" (30). Which is to say, there is nothing we are meant to do, nothing for which we are designed, no end, no ultimate purpose. Humanity constructs standards through choices (and politics). MacDonald finally raises the point that we are social creatures, and this was where I felt we might have come up with a grounding for so-called natural rights. If all natural rights (and civil rights, though MacDonald points out that natural rights tend to be political in character) are about human interactions with one another, are simply about our social nature, can this not be our grounding? Because human beings exist in societies, these are rights that they have? Or is this still an appeal to utilitarianism and other groundings/arguments simply in new clothing?
I struggled with this, and then went back and reread the end of the essay.
She moves on to a discussion of assertions, of values. I was struck by a passage at the bottom of page 39: "For there are no true or false beliefs about values, but only better or worse decisions and choices. And to encourage the better decisions we need to employ devices which are artistic rather than scientific. For our aim is not intellectual assent, but practical effects" (40). So, does this mean that a discussion of natural rights, for all intents and purposes, is merely about having the right effects? And if so, do we only use the natural rights arguments because they tend to be successful (which, actually, they haven't been)? Are there really natural rights at all according to MacDonald? Because by the end I thought her answer was "no" but my classmates' posts have made me question my reading.

Natural Rights

Do we have natural rights? If so how did we get them? Were people put on this Earth with a sense of natural rights that were given to us by being human? If natural rights exist, where do they come from? These are a few questions I had while reading MacDonald's essay on natural rights.

In the beginning of the article, some philosophers argue that it was directly connected to the American and French Revolution that we have natural rights. The outcome of those two revolutions created much thought and from that came many rights of man. From this came that no man should ever be held in slavery because that infringes on his 'natural right' to be free. Where did this come from? Why does every man have a 'natural right' to be free? "This, however, is a natural status as opposed to one determined by social convention. Every man is human 'by nature'; no human being is 'by nature' a slave of another human being." as stated on page 23. This says that since nature created us and not man that no man can be a slave to another. Since man didn't create the world or everything in it, there is no reason for man to think that he has rights over another human being.

Rousseau, on page 25, talks about how every man is free and yet he is always in chains. Why is this? To my knowledge, I think that every man is free but he is bound by the laws that are greater than he. Rousseau is saying, I think, that every man is born free and he has that right to be free but he is limited because of the Constitution and because of the laws put in place. Even though every man is free they are not entirely free.

Natural Law

Margaret MacDonald brings to light some pretty interesting questions, such as, how can facts about nature be discovered which have never been observed or confirmed by observation? She is talking about natural laws and how they are imperfect according to mans law. How natural laws are unwritten, might even be unknown, yet applies to all men everywhere. And how natural laws are only imperfectly realized through positive laws, is that to say that there could be some natural laws out there that we have not reasoned with yet. For instance the proliferation of laws/rights in recent times have brought forth laws which never were considered rights before they were brought up, now that they are in open view being debated people are thinking that they are “natural” human rights. Why all of a sudden have we expanded and fought for rights in away never before seen? MacDonald says that we are able to know these natural laws through reason because men can reason; so the greater our intellectual capacity becomes, the better our reasoning becomes and thus the more natural laws are realized through this? I might be way off, but if natural laws are only imperfectly realized through positive laws, then the proliferation of rights in recent years might not be as bad as we think if in fact we are realizing new natural laws through this.

Mistake

I just realized that I spelled MacDonald's name wrong. Please disregard the errors.

MacDonald

After our numerous class discussions about the nature of moral rights, I was a little relieved to read MacDonald’s claim that “Intellectuals often complain that political propaganda, for example, is not conducted as if it were scientific argument. But if moral values are not capable of scientific proof it would be irrational to treat them as if they were” (40). For some reason, I think I’ve been overlooking the obvious: there are few (if any) easy answers in our discussion of the nature of moral rights. If there were, we wouldn’t need to read such a variety of viewpoints on the nature of moral rights. I know I should have thought of this earlier, but it made me a little more comfortable nonetheless.

MacDonald’s idea that one should argue to defend a right in the same way that a critic may argue seems intuitive to me (after all, it seems that much of the rights discourse that we encounter in our everyday lives are simply arguments for or against the existence of a particular right), and it ties in well with Wellman’s oft-asserted idea that some may claim that a moral right exists when such a right does not actually exist. Of course, this leads to the following question: who decides? I’m not entirely convinced by MacDonald’s argument here. She writes: “Decisions concerning the worth of societies and social institutions are not made by an elite, or by rulers, or by a governing class but, explicitly or by acceptance, by those who live and work in a society and operate its institutions. But these decisions may be changed by the effective propaganda of a minority who have reached other decisions of whose value they desire to convince the majority” (36). Thus, it seems to me that MacDonald is implying the majority rules over rights, but a well-organized minority can create a new majority. This is troubling for me because I see rights as a shield (of sorts) that prevents the government from intruding into certain aspects of our lives; as such, rights often benefit the minority because they protect those without power from those who have it. If the majority is determining our rights, then what can prevent the tyranny of the majority? I also get the sense that MacDonald would argue that the majority agrees to these norms through some type of informal consensus rather than a formal decision-making mechanism (like voting). If this is correct, I’m wondering about the fluidity of rights. In MacDonald’s conception of rights, do rights come and go as time and social context change, or are rights static over time?

Waldron-McDonald

While reading this first article, I attempted to find McDonald's explanation of why humans have rights. Although I am a little confused about natural law and natural laws, McDonald claims that humans have rights because of their ability to reason and think rationally. Further, McDonald agrees with Locke, saying that men are subject to natural law even before the creation of society. Even under such conditions, there are instances where this natural law or right is not recognized. Slaves, for example ought to be free, yet they are not because their moral right is not legally recongnized.

Interestingly, McDonald argues that rationality in humans involves abstract thinking. Although certain non human animals have the capacity to live in societies and have simple forms of government, they cannot think in the manner of symbols. That is what elevates them above other animals and gives them right to claim moral rights.

I was hoping that we can elaborane on the following quote in class.
"Perhaps, ultimately, men get the societies and governments which they choose, even if not those they deserve, for they may deserve better than passion, indolance and ignorance permits them to choose." (36)

It was one among the most interesting/puzzling ones I encountered.

This is where I stand

The idea of "natural rights" is puzzling--it is something few people would contest but not something we generally take the time to defend in a rigorous manner. This is Macdonald's point. She argues that when we defend a concept like natural rights--something so intuitive--we ought to believe it to be true absent good response. This fit in perfectly with the end of our last discussion. I like this as a preliminary point of discussion about the nature of moral rights. It avoids the typical response to arguments that base our natural rights in our reasoning capacity; even those without reason are due rights because we are reasoning beings. It is not merely the fact that we have reason but the fact that we are human--and we use reason to defend this premise. This "justification" model fits in with Macdonald's viewing of rights as decisions. Decisions aren't natural objects in the world, but instead stances we take. We defend them, and, if open minded, are willing to change our minds. Natural rights have been defended so vehemently and universally (some of them) that it seems, to me, like a reasonable stance to take.

Macdonald touches on a lot of the discussions we've had thus far. For example, on page 32, she talks about how the reason people have often invoked the language of natural rights is because of the force they carry--in a sense, it shows you mean business. I also appreciate the delineation of different types of propositions--I think that sometimes our discussion falls into the trap of mixing them up. Natural rights, she claims, are not really empirical or tautological statements (which, on face, would seem more intuitive;) instead, they are ought statements. We believe fundamentally that people are due these rights on an ethical basis, not merely that it is a logical consequence of being human or a natural property. This reminds me very much of Wellman's work--particularly Challenge and Response.

One distinction, though, that I think is important is the impetus Macdonald puts on persuasion. I'm not sure I agree with her here. Why need she call it persuasion and not merely argument? I think that persuasion has a role in convincing people, but I'm not sure its the best basis of a stance. I think that argument is where one should stand--there are clearly reasons for believing in natural rights, and as long as the attacks fail, we should continue to hold that belief.

If we are relying on persuasion, I am not sure that rights are the best way to capture what Macdonald is talking about. Perhaps the language of care would be better. I haven't thought this all the way through, yet, though; what do you all think?

I liked reading the individual, in depth article. I'm looking forward to this book.

If we believe that we have a right and practice that right, such as the right to an education, and then for some reason that right is taken from us is this now an alleged moral right? Also are there any absolute rights that anyone can think of? Is this kind of delimma what Wellman talks about in chapter 7 about going to far? I have to agree with his conclusion about the prolifration of rights being a good thing, You have to stand for something or you'll fall for anything!

Wellman says that we should not try to solve every social problem with rights and that we need to evaluate these rights for their individual merits (169). He also claims that “the language or rights in political discourse is that it invites dogmatism and inhibits any rational dialogue between those who disagree on social and legal issues.” These statements sum up a lot of the confusion I’ve had recently with the nature of rights in society. Prior to reading the book rights had always seemed to be an absolute good. Most high school history classes focus on how the US has expanded its civil rights and how expansion of personal rights is an unquestioned, universal good. Wellman first argues that we need to look at rights on their own merits and not as part of the group of legal rights. We shouldn’t assume that all legal rights are equal and especially valuable. Certain legal rights are more important than others, and some aren’t the best way to social problems.

In the United States our views of rights seem to be absolute. We claim individual rights that we feel outweigh every other consideration and shouldn’t be questioned. The language or rights seems to often impede political and social debates. The debate about abortion seems like it hasn’t progressed or changed in years. Both sides claim their rights and believe their rights outweigh all other considerations. When we believe we have a moral right, we no longer have to take anything else into consideration. Getting away from the rhetoric or rights in these debates may help us to realize neither side has a claim to absolute truth and both sides can be debated and challenged.

Hierarchy of Rights

Several times in his last chapter Wellman mentions considering legal and moral rights based on their relative importance to each other. This assertion presupposes that some legal and moral rights are more important than others and the offhand way in which Wellman tosses in this phrase implies that at least he considers the question of determining which rights are more important and why to be an easy one to answer, not worth commenting on. So what criteria determine which moral or legal rights are more important than others? Does the hierarchy of rights fall along generational lines, prioritizing civil and political rights above economic, social and cultural rights? How does a difference in the importance of a right change our interaction and understanding of it?

I would also like to continue the conversation begun by Michael and Cameron about how moral rights interact within and beyond society. Wellman says that asserting moral rights is the first step toward demanding change in social institutions. It makes sense that the newly established moral rights can enact change in a society, but doesn't it also follow that a change in society can enact a change in moral rights? After all, do moral rights remain universal and unchanged even as our societal mores change? What morals would the rights be ascribed to then?

Is the Proliferation of Rights a good thing or a bad thing?

In chapter seven Wellman begins to argue his opinion about the proliferation of both Legal and Moral Rights. Wellman argues on behalf of legal rights that, "it is a mistake to praise or condemn the proliferation of legal rights wholesale; one should assess the merits and defects of each new right individually" (pg 172). I personally agree with Wellman on this stance. I think that trying to assess the entire proliferation of rights as being either good or bad is not the right way of doing things.

One problem that struck me was the problem of language in the proliferation of rights. As is often the case when new rights are being argued, they are being argued not on the grounds of discovering Truth, but rather the arguers have an agenda that propels them to argue in a certain way. As Wellman says "Because there is no effective way and nonprejudicial way to prevent any public speaker from asserting any right that springs to her mind, what is needed is not an attempt to reduce the number or variety of asserted moral rights but an effort to greatly increase discussion within political discourse" (pg 178). In an ideal world the discussion of a new right would be unbiased from politics or whatever personal convictions one may have. However, we do not live in such a world and this problem of rights being established with bias troubles me. I wonder what others think about this problem and if there is another solution other than that which Wellman gives on page 181 "whether on balance it will be beneficial or harmful depends primarily upon whether or the public to whom it is addressed is politically engaged, informed, and critical".

One Factor

Wellman concludes by saying, “Although seriously defective in many ways, the proliferation of rights has done much more good than harm.”(182). I would agree with Wellman on the content he has laid before us that we are in a better place as a society now, working for justice then we were before this proliferation began. Although I do disagree on some of the positions he has taken. It seems to me that the underlying problem for many of these legal and moral rights rest in our judicial system. We can keep forming groups and fighting for what we believe in but until our legal system restructures itself, we are going to keep adding rights and thus devaluing fundamental and more important rights, legal or moral. So if our judicial system is over burdened perhaps it is a consequence of its own actions; by tolerating and listening to so many groups fighting for rights that devalue the current rights we hold.

Wellman Ch. 7

To attempt an answer and the previous post, I’ll posit the following. I don’t think we “issue” rights at all; instead, rights always exist, and we, at some point in time, decide to realize or formalize them. So, I think that women (for example) always had the right to vote, but they were denied the opportunity to exercise their right until it was recognized by the Constitution. It seems odd to me that rights would be something that magically materialize out of nowhere, so I think they would have to be omnipresent. But, I could be completely wrong.

In the last chapter of his book, Wellman moves beyond his attempt to provide a neutral analysis of a variety of arguments, and he begins to state his own positions. In the process, he comments on legal rights, moral rights, and rights discourse. I’m in a state of confusion about some of Wellman’s claims about the legal and moral rights.

First, when assessing the proliferation of legal rights, Wellman chose to center his discussion around the following question: “Has this proliferation of legal rights improved our international and domestic law?” (168). I’m a little confused why he chose this question as the touchstone of his discussion. As we discussed in class, Wellman argued earlier in the book that legal rights should be assessed on procedural grounds; one should try to determine if the right in question is effective when put into practice. Why, I wonder, is this missing from the central question of his analysis of the proliferation of legal rights? I suppose that “effective legal rights” are included in a possible “improvement” to the legal system; at the same time, I wonder on what grounds or by what criteria one can assess a possible “improvement” in the legal system (and, I wonder, if the purpose of a legal right is to improve the legal system at all). It seems to me that we can assess the “improvement” of the legal system based on such normative considerations as efficacy, fairness, and justice, but I don’t think that a proliferation of rights necessarily forces the legal system to improve (or not improve). Am I missing something here?

Regarding moral rights, I was confused about Wellman’s claim that “Because the existence of moral rights is independent both of our moral convictions and of the moral code of any society, it is hard to know if any alleged moral right is genuine. Whether some moral right really exists depends upon whether it has adequate grounds, whether there are moral reasons sufficient to justify its assertion” (172). My question is the following: how can moral rights be independent “of our moral convictions and of the moral code of any society?” If they are independent of these factors, then upon what do they depend? Also, who determines if there are “adequate grounds” for a moral right? What happens if reasonable people disagree about the grounds (or is that even possible)? I hope we have time to discuss this in class on Thursday.

Are you using moral rights for you or for me?

Another question I'd like to pose is this:

In regards to MORAL rights, do you think we issue them because we feel the subject needs the right, or do we issue rights to define ourselves, either as a community or as a self?

A post to make up for Tues and onto Thursday--remember who's talking

I was particularly interested in the animal rights section becuase of the new domain it introduces. But I think it is also good to remember that animals themselves do not observe either legal rights or moral rights, probably becuase they don't care. The term "law of the jungle" means to me that anything goes and there are no rights whatsoever. This is the "law" animals observe. Humans, on the other hand, spend considerable time on the subject--so much that they feel inclined to post on a website about it. WE, humans, assign them those rights. They don't give them to themselves...or at least as far as we know.

Say I'm walking in the woods, and ten wolves jump me. If they want to eat me, they are going to. They don't care if I say, "I have a right to live!"--I'm food. I think a Max (Dr. McCrickerd's dog) wouldn't see going on a walk as a right or priviledge...it just is to him. I have a feeling Grizzly Bears would love to store, breed, and eat humans if they could.

What's interesting to me about animal rights is the driving force that compels us to assign them moral/legal rights, when we know they would not do the same for us. Why bother?

My answer would be that humans are conditioned to protect the innocent outside their own families and communities. We see animals, we love them, and feel a duty to protect them...most of the time. Animals don't have that--or at least I haven't seen one that does.

"My cubs are my business, your's are your business. If they trot over here, I'll eat them. Stick to the boundaries," the lioness says.

She protects her immediate family. No one else. So why do we, she asks. Why do humans care?

Jasmine, I am completely in the same boat as you. I think that theone of the main points of this book, and class is to determine what has rights and what qualities does one need to have to have rights. It is hard for me to pinpoint those exact qualities, but I can agree with Rachels that it is the biographical and not biological life that makes a difference. Now, the definition of a biographical life is one that can easily be applied to humans. How do we measure the goals and memories of other animals? I believe that is where this definition is flawed, but we have to go off of something.

In regards to environmental rights, I believe that people are selfish and disregard nature. We have been given reasources through nature that we have abused and not respected. I believe it is not until crisis that people take action in matters that seem inconvenient for them. People have been destroying the planet, but only recently have we taken serious action to prevent the severity of the damages. This also reminds me of what we talked about in class. For something to have rights means that they have them regardless of social circumstances. It might be inconvenient for humans to give animals rights (to life), but their rights exist either way. My biggest issue with animal rights is the possibility of their killing from other non-human animals. It is hard to enforce animals' right to life when other species depend on them for survival as well. Did nature intend animals and humans to have a moral right to life?

Chapters 5 & 6

What makes a moral right a right? Is it the ability to communicate and articulate that you have a right? Do you have to be goal driven and have humanistic qualities? The problem I have with Rachels is that he says some animals or higher species of animals are intelligent (99) does this mean that only those animals have rights and how can we fairly draw that line?

On 162 Lynch is discussing health care rights and talks about how taxes for medicare and medicade violates some of our rights? It seems to be an on going theme in this book that when we are trying to gain one right we lose another how do we know which ones are more significant or at least place our rights on some kind of equal playing field? After all healthcare is important to all of us especially when it comes to our loved ones, specifically children, but we should have to compromiseour liberty rights to obtain it.

Currently, giving animals moral rights seems to stretch the definition of a right. Hart claims duties, rather than rights, explain how we should act toward animals. Many of the authors also argue that a right relies on the ability of a person to claim this right. Although there are certain exceptions with people, such as infants, it is claimed that a parent or guardian can claim those right. Those arguing for animal rights say that someone can represent an animal and claim their rights for them. Although this may make sense theoretically, it is much more difficult and confusing in practice. There are many cases when an animal may not have any person willing to represent it or claim its rights. There also may be conflict among people over who can claim its rights. In practice it seems that protection and humane treatment of animals is best expressed through duties and not rights.

The bigger issue is that of legal rights for animals since this seems to have less support than moral rights. US laws view animals as issues of property rights (113) and heavily favor claims made by people rather than animals. This provides little protection for animals under current laws.

Although Wellman did briefly mention examples of animal cruelty, there didn’t seem to be much about how eating meat would be affected by an animal’s moral or legal rights. It seems widely accepted that people have a duty to not abuse or torture animals, but that doesn’t necessarily exclude eating of meat. This reminds me of earlier when Wellman talked about how rights can be overused and can create greater divisions over issues. Many people probably agree that torturing animals is bad, but probably don’t believe that animals have a moral or legal right not to killed for food. Claims of such rights might polarize the issue and distract focus from things like animal abuse.

In looking at Wellman's final chapters, he covers the idea of rights and how one determines who/what has rights. Based on the arguments he presents, it seems that a person/animal/plant must only have representatives to argue for their rights. The example for why this is viable concerns a newborn child, which has rights but no ability to recognize/attempt to protect those rights. Some say that this fact (the ability for babies to have rights) is enough to justify the rights of plants and animals to similar rights (such as the right to life, or those animals/plants wouldn't attempt to survive).
My main criticisms for this are two:
1. The right to try to survive is one I believe all creatures possess, but the main word in that right is "try." History (and most likely pre-history) dictates that survival of the fittest is key in survival, and in order for living things to thrive, other living things perish in that process. This concept seems intrinsic to nature.
2. Referring to the baby argument above, it has one criticism. The difference between babies and plants/animals which can't defend themselves is simple-babies do develop the capacity to determine at least some of their rights, while plants/animals lack the cognitive ability at any point in their lives to understand rights or the concept of having rights. This fact is left out of the reading as far as I can tell, or at the very least not highly considered as a viable criticism.
For me, these criticisms are enough in themselves to override the idea that animals/plants have special rights. Instead, it is up to humans (as we live in a highly social setting compared to any other species, which in part has led to our development of rights conception) to bestow ideas of decency towards animals/plants upon other members of society.

Moral authority

Wellman writes on page 127, "...how could we know which person or persons have the moral authority to represent each individual animal right-holder?" This quote is a good summary of some of the concerns expressed in our posts. My first question is, not only how do we know who has the moral authority, but how does one define moral authority? This brings us back to Ernie's post reflecting on the importance and technicality of definitions and how such definitions define our discourse. As I commented under Rachel's recent post, I think that moral authority definitely has a standing in our society, perhaps equal to, if not greater than, legal authority. However, even if we agree that moral authority shapes legal discourse, how do we know what the proper definition of such moral authority is and who gets to decide? This chapter has made me change my thinking of rights because I always thought of rights as something that can be claimed. But if animals are unable to claim their rights, then who gets to claim such rights on their behalf? I certainly do not have any answers to these questions yet, but I think they are interesting in shaping our conversation.

Objective Morals vs Subjective Morals

Katy writes"I think it would be interesting to consider moral rights as a whole, removed from the categories Wellman has put them in to see how the rights theories conflict and complicate each other when trying to establish the beliefs a single individual has on which moral rights exist. "
I too find the nature of morality fascinating. And although Wellman has not really dove into the arguments for and against the idea of universal morality i think it is an important issue that will eventually have to be faced in our understanding of rights and responsibilities. I don't think most people would argue that we don't have subjective moral rights, that can be established by asking everyone you know their moral beliefs. Where the topic gets interesting, for me anyway, is asking about the possibility of objective moral rights. Moreover, if we have objective moral rights, how do we affirm this and from whom/what were they created by? As I understand it, if there exists objective moral rights we have no way of knowing what they are? What I'm wondering now is how much of a factor should we consider moral rights to be in a legal sense if they are merely subjective, or does it matter?

Chapter 5

While reading chapter 5 I keep thinking that if animals and the environment have all these rights and it is wrong to kill them what are we humans supposed to eat? Don't we have a right to nourish ourselves? I mean isn't some views in this chapter implying that even vegetables have rights because they are living organisms? Also if we can have protection for animals and infants and the disabled that can't speak for themselves why doesn't this apply to a fetus. . .

Animal Rights

The animal rights movement, whichever side one is for, seems to run into some serious problems concerning other issues. Rachel’s argument dealing with why animals have a right to life fails to explain why the normal human has a right to life and therefore assumes that adult human beings have a fundamental right to life, but on what ground? Wellman talks about three fundamental properties dealing with who can possess a right to life and the one which seems to question animal’s rights is autonomy: being able to make rational decisions and moral choices. Non-human animals do in fact lack this attribute which “most” humans possess. But if this is the case then do infants and mentally disabled people have a right to life? That is when the situation gets a little stickier, because then people can claim on behalf of someone to be their right holder. Animal rights activists argue that they can claim on behalf of animals the same way adults do for infants. But then the claim turns into if one had potential to be a right holder themselves then it would be different and since animals cannot ever become rational beings they cannot possess this right to life. Then the question turns to whether this is a moral right or legal right. Under current law the animals (domestic or wild) are property by private or state/national parties. If the animal is mistreated they cannot claim against their owner because of mistreatment, they lack the rational to perform this action.

I think that the animal rights activists should be fighting more so for treatment of animals versus giving animals actual rights which they possess. Mistreatment of animals should be illegal because we should have a responsibility to treat them humane not because they have a right to be treated humanely. Giving animals rights seems to uproot some of our fundamental rights for being human and what that holds, for humans and humans alone. If animals are granted rights what rights would we lose as being rational beings? It seems ridiculous to grant a whole species rights in which they have no comprehension of the right and practice cannibalism.

Mike writes:

"Morals are individually held. Whereas all individuals are expected to follow the law, we don't expect all individuals to follow the same moral code. Whereas all reasonable people follow the law, reasonable people can disagree about the moral action to take in a particular circumstance."

I'm not sure I agree with this statement. When you say that killing an innocent person is morally wrong, do you mean that it is wrong for you as an individual to kill or do you mean it is wrong for anyone? I think everyone is weary of being controlled by someone else's view of morality, but isn't that just because we believe there view is wrong, and not merely different? Also, does disagreement necessitate that there is no right answer? There was a time when there was much disagreement about the shape of Earth. Does this make both sides right? I'm not sure what the right answer is, but these are questions I often ponder.

After reading these chapters, I think I better understand at least one question we are up against. As Wellman eludes to on 110/11, a lot of the discussion happening is simply one of definitions. Different authors assert that certain conditions are necessary for someone to have a right. How, then, do we decide which definition of "rights" is better? Mike provides the quote from 111 before. Wellman seems to believe that the definition that is most consistent and/or provides the best way to talk about morality should be used. In that sense, the authors are not necessary arguing about which definition is more true but instead which is more useful. To that end, we can talk about certain conditions for a right being "meaningless" (110).

It is difficult for me to fathom that people actually believe that everyone isn't due a right to minimal health care. The libertarian arguments never make sense to me. No one garners well independent of everyone else in society--one person is generally advantaged at the cost of others. People are often placed in situations of which they have little to no control. Children have no control over where they live, yet where they live has significant effect on their health. Even if we disregard the talk of rights (which, of course, is the subject Wellman is discussing) we certainly have a duty to others. I'm surprised there isn't more discussion of the rights of children to health care. Is it generally agreed upon that all children have this right? Or, that this right can be claimed on their behalf?

I'm intrigued by the argument on page 121. How is it that we decide which characteristics count when talking about morality? Is it really a human centric view to presuppose rationality matters more than other characteristics? I think the best argument in favor of animal rights is the "subject of a life" argument presented by Regan. The author asks an important question, though: What makes one "subject of a life?" There are lots of brightline issues in these two chapters, whether it be a discussion of suicide, what counts as "life," what constitutes an aim, etc. In the end, regardless of whether we use the language of rights, I am compelled that torturing animals is wrong. Its just a matter of figuring out why.