Moral authority

Wellman writes on page 127, "...how could we know which person or persons have the moral authority to represent each individual animal right-holder?" This quote is a good summary of some of the concerns expressed in our posts. My first question is, not only how do we know who has the moral authority, but how does one define moral authority? This brings us back to Ernie's post reflecting on the importance and technicality of definitions and how such definitions define our discourse. As I commented under Rachel's recent post, I think that moral authority definitely has a standing in our society, perhaps equal to, if not greater than, legal authority. However, even if we agree that moral authority shapes legal discourse, how do we know what the proper definition of such moral authority is and who gets to decide? This chapter has made me change my thinking of rights because I always thought of rights as something that can be claimed. But if animals are unable to claim their rights, then who gets to claim such rights on their behalf? I certainly do not have any answers to these questions yet, but I think they are interesting in shaping our conversation.