Monday, February 23, 2009

Lyons

I, like Mike, struggled to understand exactly what Lyons is saying on 118. I understand (I think) his overall general argument but, upon reading that passage, failed to understand how it connects up with what I think he's saying and what the syllabus indicates hes saying. Perhaps this indicates that his argument is more complex than I think it is. Maybe I'm just thinking about that paragraph too much. I also, admittedly, got lost in some of his answers to why rule utility would overcome his objections--as far as I can tell he makes a distinction between the institution and the actors within the institution and that differentiates it or something. He also argues on 130 that any overarching rules would either be counter-utilitarian or would have to be overridden.

I have only one major question about this section. I understand his argument that utility would require us to override rights that were not utilitarian (Cameron's comment on Mike's post sums this up really well). What I don't understand completely is how he can argue for limited utility considerations (120). It makes sense to me; of course there are some situations in which it intuitively makes sense to allow for utility to be the overriding principle, but we wouldn't want to always act in favor of the most utilitarian option. He italicizes the words within limits--why is this a legitimate move to make? What is the line at which utility becomes the primary consideration? In what ways can we legitimately establish this point? I'm not doubting that it can be done, I'm just not sure he ever establishes such a point here--or, to think of it in another way, how utility factors in to be compared with other factors. To what extent must we account for utility? Where do we draw the line?

No comments:

Post a Comment