Monday, February 9, 2009

This is where I stand

The idea of "natural rights" is puzzling--it is something few people would contest but not something we generally take the time to defend in a rigorous manner. This is Macdonald's point. She argues that when we defend a concept like natural rights--something so intuitive--we ought to believe it to be true absent good response. This fit in perfectly with the end of our last discussion. I like this as a preliminary point of discussion about the nature of moral rights. It avoids the typical response to arguments that base our natural rights in our reasoning capacity; even those without reason are due rights because we are reasoning beings. It is not merely the fact that we have reason but the fact that we are human--and we use reason to defend this premise. This "justification" model fits in with Macdonald's viewing of rights as decisions. Decisions aren't natural objects in the world, but instead stances we take. We defend them, and, if open minded, are willing to change our minds. Natural rights have been defended so vehemently and universally (some of them) that it seems, to me, like a reasonable stance to take.

Macdonald touches on a lot of the discussions we've had thus far. For example, on page 32, she talks about how the reason people have often invoked the language of natural rights is because of the force they carry--in a sense, it shows you mean business. I also appreciate the delineation of different types of propositions--I think that sometimes our discussion falls into the trap of mixing them up. Natural rights, she claims, are not really empirical or tautological statements (which, on face, would seem more intuitive;) instead, they are ought statements. We believe fundamentally that people are due these rights on an ethical basis, not merely that it is a logical consequence of being human or a natural property. This reminds me very much of Wellman's work--particularly Challenge and Response.

One distinction, though, that I think is important is the impetus Macdonald puts on persuasion. I'm not sure I agree with her here. Why need she call it persuasion and not merely argument? I think that persuasion has a role in convincing people, but I'm not sure its the best basis of a stance. I think that argument is where one should stand--there are clearly reasons for believing in natural rights, and as long as the attacks fail, we should continue to hold that belief.

If we are relying on persuasion, I am not sure that rights are the best way to capture what Macdonald is talking about. Perhaps the language of care would be better. I haven't thought this all the way through, yet, though; what do you all think?

I liked reading the individual, in depth article. I'm looking forward to this book.

2 comments:

  1. I think the reason she uses the word persuasion instead of argument is because she is taking the stance that our belief in a right is generally hinged on being persuaded that the right is the natural conclusion to other beliefs we already have been convinced are true. She argues that value claims can not be proven thus to make a claim that one ought to behave in a certain manner because it is ethical in the end will require an act persuasion that this act is the logical conclusion of other beliefs. At least that is what I thought she was trying to explain with the argument about what writer is better. What I thought was really interesting is this idea of merit. I thought it was interesting that she is ok with merely using our humanity as the reason for human rights. I understand the desire to argue that it ought not be based on merit or a characteristic that is not equal in all humans. I feel like I missed something because Ernie says in his post that it is because most of us are reasoning beings and I didn't find that part. I felt the argument was that we have just posited these natural rights because the cohere with our beliefs about how we think the world ought to be. It is a value claim which we hold because we have been convinced it is best. BUt again I could be wrong.

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  2. I had similar thoughts about the choice of "persuasion" over "argument," but I think her discussion of legal argument provides some context for her word choice. I wonder if she sees argument as something where there is a right/wrong dichotomy (guilty/not guilty), and persuasion is more of a continuum (you are moving toward a conclusion, but you can never reach it).

    As for the choice of "care" vs. "right," I was a little confused by her use of the word "value" at the end of the article. It seemed like her discussion moved away from rights and toward more ambiguous ideas of values. In my mind, those are different concepts. Do you think that she sees them as synonymous, or is she trying to do different things with her discussions of rights and values?

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