When he talks about the Rule of Absolutism, he says that “it is at this level that one asks whether the right to life of all persons or of all innocent persons is absolute.” And that this raises the problem of exceptions. And concludes that either, no rights are absolute because they all involve some specifications or that all rights are equally absolute because once their specifications are allowed they are entirely valid. But then he goes on to say that there are certain types of specification that do not debar it from being absolute. What? Why does he claim that there are no specifications to absolute rights and then say that, well there are three specifications that are specifications, but they don’t count as specifications? His arguments for absolute rights seem to get caught up in a number of places. One of the biggest problems and he addresses it once in the text, is that he uses a hypothetical situation. Is that what is referring to when he talks about abstract? Why not use a situation like, A will happen if B is not completed. Instead of using, A might still happen even if B is completed.
I see the overall point he is trying to make but, don’t see how everything fits together to make his point. Such as Cameron has pointed out that this seems to be another right which cannot stand by itself. Because for one, it seems that there are exceptions to this right and if there are exceptions isn’t one thing about this right, is the fact that it is absolute?
Mental Models of Purpose of College
2 years ago
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