Hart

In the early part of his essay, Hart asserts that “it is still important to remember that there may be codes of conduct quite properly termed moral codes… which do not employ the notion of a right, and there is nothing contradictory or otherwise absurd in a code or morality consisting wholly of prescriptions or in a code which prescribed only what should be done for the realization of happiness or some ideal of personal perfection” (78). In other words, Hart implies two things with this statement. First, any particular code of conduct does not necessarily imply a moral right; simply because an individual’s moral code would lead that individual to perform or not to perform a task does not mean that a right exists. Second, even if that code of conduct is based upon morals (I separate a code of conduct and a moral code of conduct because I can see codes of conduct—such as those that are required by employers—that are not necessarily based upon morals), such moral actions may not imply the existence of a right. Thus, Hart asserts that the existence of certain codes of conduct or moral beliefs does not necessarily imply the existence of a right.
I think that Hart’s claim is helpful to the conversations we have been having in class about the qualifications for the existence of a moral right. It seems to me like we have been wondering at what point a moral belief is transformed into a moral right. Hart’s assertion here provides a partial answer to our question; although we do not know the point at which such moral beliefs are transformed into moral rights (if such a point does, indeed, exist), Hart helps us to understand that not every moral right is necessarily implied by a particular code of conduct or moral code. As such, just because an individual or group of individuals holds a particular belief does not necessarily mean that their belief is a right.
I suppose this makes sense; we know from Wellman that many moral rights are “alleged” moral rights—some people may assert them but they do not actually exist. So, Hart’s claim that beliefs do not necessarily imply a moral right seems to be similar to Wellman’s notion of the existence of “alleged” moral rights.
So, I have the following question: have MacDonald, Hart, or Wellman argued as to the existence of a point at which a moral right vests? In other words, have we read a claim of a particular “tipping point” when a moral belief does imply a moral right?