Thursday, February 26, 2009

Dworkin

"Political preferences, like the Nazi's preference, are on the same level-purport to occupy the same space-as the utilitarian theory itself. Therefore, though the utilitarian theory must be neutral between personal preferences like the preference for push-pin and poetry, as a matter of theory of justice, it cannot, without contradiction, be neutral between itself and Nazism." (157)

Why does Dworkin make this distinction? What if the people truly believe that having a Nazi form of government will create the most pleasure, will they be utilitarian or Nazi? As I understand Dworkin, util. and Nazism are on the same level, and Nazism is not solely a preferance (although in this case it would be). Maybe I am misunderstanding utilitarianism.
Also, on page 156 he talks about intensity of preferences, and how that is a way to measure what will be prioritized. How is this equality, if one's desires count more than others?

On page 166, Dworkin writes "We need rights, as a distinct element in political theory...community's general welfare lies." Why is he saying that rights are necesssary for the minorities whose interests will be overlooked to promote the greatest good, if he believes that utilitarianism does not have to take into account all preferences?

1 comment:

  1. I got tripped up by the Nazi example while I was reading it, but this is what I think it means. Dworkin argues that utilitarianism and Nazism cannot exist at the same time because one cannot attempt to create maximum utility for everyone while at the same time being a Nazi. So, he says that utilitarianism can be neutral between personal preferences (like what kind of food you want to eat), but it cannot stay silent about an individual's larger beliefs because they directly contradict the utilitarian principle.

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