Thursday, April 30, 2009

Community Organizing

Interesting link regarding community organizers - http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/fashion/12organizer.html
I wonder what Dagger would think of this.

Whoah! Pogge really does not hold anything back...

In reference to the Nazi analogy, he states, “Given what they knew about the ongoing war and genocide and their own causal roles, they ought to have thought, and chosen, and then acted differently…And if this is how we think about most Germans in the early 1940s, then this is how we must surely think about ourselves, seeing that we enjoy so much more freedom to inform ourselves and to act politically” (151). Yes, Mike, this definitely got my attention too, very powerful. Although he states, “The point of this parallel is not to raise issues of blame or guilt,” but, that the “common point is thoughtlessness,” (151) this is really a strong parallel to make.
I do agree with his point of thoughtlessness, though. I was really pleased with Chapter 5, because when I read Chapter 4, with regard to the double standard, institutional responsibilities, and international recognition of groups in power, I couldn’t help but wonder how we have allowed such things to occur within our global order. My initial thought hinted at the way we view nations within the international sphere, and a specific question I had, when reading Chapter 4, deals with the role of sovereignty in shaping our existing global economic order. So, I was pleased when I saw that Pogge begins Chapter 5 with a discussion of nationalism.

I was intrigued by his discussion regarding particularistic and universalistic ‘variants’ of nationalism. This comment is probably only valuable to me and Erma, but this distinction is really useful in understanding how the Serbs viewed nationalism in their justification of the genocide on Bosnian people. But on a broader note, this conception of nationalism, especially the distinction between common and lofty nationalism that Pogge makes, is essential, I think, to understanding the double standard argument. Particularly, what I found really thoughtful and interesting, is Pogge’s discussion of the scope of acceptable partiality in terms of the double standard discussed previously in Chapter 4. He states, “How can we despise those who seek to slant the national playing field in favor of themselves and their relatives and yet applaud those who seek to slant the international playing field in favor of themselves and their compatriots?” (130).

The reason that this entire discussion makes me wonder what role sovereignty plays, is because of the way that state sovereignty trumps human rights within the scope of international law. As the sovereignty argument or justification goes, states may overlook problems across the world because they value sovereignty (which may be defined in various ways, but mainly referring to the independence of each state to self-governance in the way it sees fit), and because of this notion, powerful states, although they have the capability, often refuse to meddle in the affairs of other states, despite the fact that some of these other states may be infringing or harming human rights, so as not to overstep the limits drawn by the notion of sovereignty. Most, if not all, states mutually respect sovereignty, then, because the rest of the international community abides by this notion, and because no state wants its own sovereignty disrespected, all states end up playing by the notion of sovereignty (this is similar to Pogge’s point about the “sucker exemption” which he defines as “an agent” not being “morally required to comply with rules when doing so would lead to his being victimized by non-compliers” (133).). So, although Pogge does not specifically mention sovereignty or international law in this chapter, I think it does play a large role in the reason that nationalism is so prioritized over global justice in most peoples’ and government’s thoughts and actions.

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

Nationalism

Pogge makes several valuable points in Chapters 4-5 concerning dual standards of what is rights concerning economic poverty and nationalism. I was able to identify with Pogge's position, but there are several points which need to be made regarding his arguments.
These points all revolve around nationalism. Throughout the semester, we have examined authors claiming that the larger the group of people, the less cohesive a moral theory/unifying principle is in effect. This idea is applicable to nationalism, though regrettably so. The reason we have a contradictory sense of universal morality between nations and globally is that there isn't a cohesive bond at the global level (or, at least that bond isn't understood/felt by a majority of global citizens).
History shows us that humans have been slowly, yet surely, developing a recognition of group bonds on increasingly larger stages. Nationalism has only been a recent development in human history. Eventually, I think that our social progression will lead us to a state similar to what Pogge suggests. Currently, though, this isn't possible.
In order for Pogge's conception of universal morality, especially regarding poverty, to exist, I propose the following: A global government/order must be established and constituents of that government, which would consist of all humans (in theory), would have greater allegiance to the global govt./order than nations. Such an order would circumvent numerous problems the current system faces. For example, examine poverty in a country such as China. I believe that it would be difficult for some to justify assisting those citizens who are in a state of poverty that support the Communist regime. Not only that, but those same people may also conclude we are doing the job of the Chinese government--why are we doing this when poverty exists within our own country? Both these and many other objections could be stifled by the global govt./order proposal above. As Pogge mentions, the priority would then rest with helping those in greatest poverty (for the scenario above, I assume that there are more individuals in greater poverty located in China than the U.S.), though we would be obligated to help all we could.
I have a feeling there is much more to be said on this topic--I await class to write further blog posts on these chapters.

Pogge

I found chapter five to be very interesting. I found him to be saying in 5.1 that the notion of nationalism has been taken to the extreme and by this, is in fact contributing to the problem from within. National partiality and family partiality are being tied up in one and create an unlevel playing field universally. Part of the problem is that compatriots, he argues, should take priority over foreigners, but under the current system is unacceptable. The solution, at least what he thinks, is that we need to get the current international playing field to look like that of some national playing fields, and get the partiality towards families altered along with the international playing field for compatriots. But the people who are establishing such an economic global order, have families that need to stay out of the global picture; while making their nation priority and considering the global status. Not an easy task…

He is now looking for a justification when practicing national partiality. But he must prove that the global economic problem is in large part traced back to the national stage. I like his example of how if a mom comes upon their child and they are hurt they give them priority over the others, but if the child’s injuries along with his friends injuries are the mothers fault, then priority goes to the child’s friends. “When the undue harms foreigners suffer are our own wrong doing, foreigners and compatriots are on par.”(139) and essentially he goes on to say that by honoring this (previous example) is not disloyal to one’s country. Our positive duty toward others is greater when dealing with compatriots, but our negative duty when it is our own doing is equivalent when dealing with foreigners. He goes on to challenge the first world citizen’s belief, that which is a positive duty to help the poor, not a negative one.

He says that the ‘common notion’ of poverty rests largely on the assumption that it is their own governments fault and short-coming to their own citizens and that the other wealthy nations do not have a positive duty to help and our negative duty is not the problem. Many of the people who are in the poverty stricken areas, he says are children and do not choose this for themselves. So the common assumption that they have chosen this or chosen their leaders or what not, is regardless of the fact that people don’t choose poverty. Another big problem is that when new leaders come into power, they inherit a mountain of debt from previous dictators and are essentially shut out of international financial markets. He puts forth a couple suggestions on what could be done but does he ever put forth how it is to be done?

Many things needed to be reformed or established, he argues, to bring an end to this problem. As Mike has pointed out, concerning his comparison to Nazi German, I found it to be a very BOLD statement (but possibly (?) very true). “And if this is how we must think about most Germans in the early 1940s, then this how we must surely think about ourselves.”(151) this is somewhat scary and repulsive, if this statement does indeed hold legitimacy, to compare our actions (or lack thereof) with the Germans in WWII.

there's no i in team...but there is in nation

I found the metaphor used early on in chapter five to be helpful in my understanding of the content of the chapter, mostly I think because of how much a sports fan I am. The metaphor was about how sports try to create level playing fields for the athletes. Moreover, "players also want games to be fair, to be structured so that the better team will tend to win" (sec.5.1 3rd pgh). However, as Pogge notes, there are added pressures associated with success on the major league level. Some players are concerned more with winning regardless (well almost regardless) of the cost. Beyond breaking the rules of play, some players go to sketchy, yet allowed, forms of play to help stack the odds in their favor. For example I doubt a player would poison another player. But he/she might be biased in arguing calls or even commit a violation on purpose in attempts of hurting/re-injuring another player for the opposing team. A problem soon arises when we begin to discuss what the idea of a level playing field means. Expanding on the metaphor further the players can symbolize entire nations and the game is about quality of life.
That being said, at the end of the chapter Pogge stresses as Mike pointed out in his post, a call to action. Pogge even goes as far as to say that "by continuing to support the current global order and the national policies that shape and sustain it without taking compensating action toward institutional reform or shielding its victims, we share a negative responsibility for the undue harms they foreseeably produce" (sec 5.4 1st pgh). It seems Pogge would like us all to be practice good sportsmanship in the game of life and play for the team (world population) and not for ourselves (individual nations). Keeping this in mind I can't help but wonder about what a universally accepted level playing field means or what it would look like.

Playing devils advocate I wonder if we can expand the sports metaphor further and suggest that Pogge is trying to be the coach of the team, telling the players how to play efficiently for the good of the time. As anyone who is a sports fan knows, there are many cases where players disregard the coach because of selfish interest or because they don't agree with the coaches philosophy. My question is what do we do when other players (nations) don't want to play for the team's sake and rather play for their own? We can't just bench or trade other nations.

Pogge 4-5

I didn’t post on Rawls for last class, so I thought I should spend a bit more time trying to unpack Pogge’s critique before class on Thursday since it seems like Rawls will be a major force in our discussion. I’ve only read idiosyncratic, anthologized excerpts of Rawls, so I’m going to try to piece together one of Pogge’s critiques as I understand it right now; feel free (anyone) to point me in the right direction if I’ve misread.

Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, sets forth a “difference principle” which states that inequalities in distribution are acceptable only if they are a part of a system that advantages the least advantaged individual within the system. However, he rejects this principle as a requirement of global justice because “it is unacceptable for one people to bear certain costs of decisions made by another” (111). I think I share Pogge’s confusion here. Why would Rawls say people are bound together by a communal decision under the veil of ignorance when it is on a national level but that decision would not apply on an international level? I feel like Rawls would have an answer here (this seems to be a fairly large issue), but maybe he doesn’t.

I was also struck by his powerful comparison between everyone who isn’t taking steps to change the global order and Nazi sympathizers at the end of chapter 5. While he makes the comparison in the conclusion to the chapter and then says that the point is not “to liken our conduct to that of Nazi sympathizers,” (something that I think may be a bit of an untruth—I think he wants us to make that comparison as part of a call to action—why else would he include it?) I think putting the two ideas side-by-side had a very powerful effect on me. Did others feel the same?

Tuesday, April 28, 2009

Concept of Poverty

A different concept of Poverty

I think it is interesting to point out what poverty is. When, I think about poverty, I think about people who have absolute nothing. People, who cannot find food, cannot find a job or even having the skills of maintaining a job; people who don’t have a decent place to sleep or take shelter, and most important from what I got from Pogge, don’t even have any human rights. Yet, to combine the concept of poverty and having no human right, never occur to me before.
On chapter 2, Pogge talks about how the government has the power to enforce laws, but at the same time, may have little enforcement in making the lower authorities to enforce the law or prevent any moral wrongs. (60). Pogge calls this “official disrespect” where the government may enforce the legal right of citizens, however disregard the humans’ right. There some instances that the government may not even enforce the laws that its creates; thus letting criminal and human rights violations act occur. “The government needs not organized or encouraged such activities – it merely stands idly by: fails to enact law that proscribe such conduct or, if such laws are on the books, fails to enforce them effectively” (61). Thus, the concept of human rights in such a government lets a person to become poor, since there are acts being committed to violate human rights through fear, economical, and force.
The other idea that Pogge brings up is the concept of the servant or the slave. “In some of these societies, inhuman or degrading treatment of domestic servants by their employers is perfectly legal…most of the servants are ignorant of their legal rights, conviction for mistreatment are difficult if not impossible to obtain, punishments are negligible” (63). It is interesting to see that when the word poverty is mention, it is usually attach to poor people and their situation. It never seems to be about their legal or human rights. In this case with the servant, not only is the servant poor and has to work as a servant and be treated badly, but s/he cannot exercise their demand for rights for anything, with the consist fear of being jobless and worse off than s/he is now as a servant. So poverty, to me, is not only about having no food, money, job, and/or shelter, but it is also about not have the right to exercise or claim any rights; which, then, traps a person within poverty.

Pogge on human rights

I found it interesting that Pogge draws a distinction between legal human rights and moral human rights, mainly because I have not heard or thought of this distinction before. He draws on this distinction to discuss how human rights should be conceived and what they assert, particularly in relation to correlative responsibilities. “The fact that some formulated right has all the conceptual features of a human right does not entail that it exists (can be justified as such)…” (59) and this is where the moral arguments are important. His distinction also becomes important when he points out the contradictions within our system of human rights laws. He provides this example, “…a government may legally bind itself never to violate human rights and yet do nothing or very little to ensure that its various agencies and officers abide by this official prohibition” (66). This means that governments cannot be solely responsible for legal human rights, but that a conception of a moral right is important because “While the government may, then, be the primary guardian of human rights and the prime measure of official disrespect, the people are their ultimate guardian on whom their realization crucially depends” (69). Therefore, the attitude of the people plays a large role in guarding human rights. This part of Pogge’s argument is similar to Dagger’s, in that, citizens need to be actively engaged in political life to preserve these rights. This ‘interactional’ conception is similar to Dagger’s argument of civic virtue and involved citizens.

Monday, April 27, 2009

Pogge

The first part of chapter two was pretty straight forward. He is looking at how human rights should be conceived. He traces human rights back to their origins, or at least back to an earlier notion of where they evolved from – natural law. But once natural law is examined he says, “It need not involve demands on one’s conduct toward other subjects at all and, even if it does, need not involve the idea that by violating such demands one has wronged these subjects.”(61) And this is different from that of natural rights because he says, “involves significant narrowing of content possibilities by introducing the idea that the relevant moral demands are based on moral concern for certain subjects; right holders.”(61) So essentially by narrowing the category, the language used today for human rights, evolved from this transition, and he goes on to break it down into four sections of the significance of human rights. I found it interesting how the notion of human rights hold an official stance and cannot be violated by just anyone, but governments and leaders specifically and not by petty criminals.

When he talks about official disrespect, is he talking about specifically the violation of human rights? Or does the violation of human rights fall under a larger category than just officials? Also, which side is he promoting in section 2.4, from my account he isn’t promoting the libertarians side because they only require negative duties, but is he promoting the maximalist side (that of positive and negative duties)? It seems to me that he is, but perhaps the maximalist side is to dramatic and is also rejecting that too.

I found chapter three to be very interesting. Specifically the part when he talks about types of incentives and how if our current morality provides ideal incentives that are regrettable by its own light, then do we have good reason to revise our current notion of morality. Our current morality is as such, or so it seems, that if we hire a middle man, we will be able to wipe our hands clean, even though we know full well what they will do before we hire them. If this is the correct take on it, then it seems that this is what so many people do to get out of having responsibility and essentially he concludes that they are not guilt-free by hiring a middleman. I know there was a lot of more going on in this chapter, but this is what I picked up on. If we could go over chapter three briefly that would help.

In 4.1 on page 98, he lays out the criteria for a universalistic concept (in this case social justice). But why is he doing this? Chapter four was difficult to follow. One area I was thoroughly lost in and didn’t know what was going on was when he starts talking about in 4.5 David Millers contextualism and 4.6 John Rawls. I understood he disagreed with Rawls on a number of fronts, but why is this distinction important for his theory?

In section 4.8 he says, “many citizens of the affluent countries are convinced of this…these people believe that, for such progress to occur, the poor countries themselves must get their house in order, must give themselves governments and political institutions that are more responsive to the needs of their population.”(117) and he goes on to say “our hands are tied.” I take it he doesn’t mean that our hands are tied but if he does, what does he mean?

How does he suggest we deal with these national causal factors that are being promoted from within? At the end of the chapter he says that his argument shows that even these national causal factors, not withstanding, we still have share responbility. But how has he shown this?
Mike asks some good questions, and I have a couple more. On the issue of manifesto rights, though, I thought he was chastising the term manifesto (and the categorization of social/economic rights there) rather than endorsing it. He seems to be critiquing other authors who try to dismiss those rights as such.

When reading about his conception of rights, I wrote that "his conception of rights makes demands I like." Like most notes I make, I'm not entirely sure what I meant here, but I think I was primary happy about three moves he made. First, the concept of offical disespect is important. Coercive institutions can't display an official disrespect (which may take different forms). Three is something significant about the role of institutions/systems which goes beyond isolated incidents of injustice and, given that, special attention needs to be paid to these abusive. Second, his conception requires that citizens not be indifferent. This is an approach I've seen authors in many of my classes take and I think its incredibly important. Its so easy to criticize "the state" or "the man" and immediately point a finger somewhere. It would be horrible to assume that there aren't others doing things that have much worse ramifications for the lives of the poor than the everyday citizen. However, there are also others who are doing a whole lot more to prevent/stop that injustice. Not merely as citizens, but as people, we should recognize when a fundamental afront to justice is occurring and act to rectify the harm. Finally, I think its an interesting move to answer the libertarians by claiming that his conception is strictly negative--we have a duty not to support coercive systems that fail to protect rights. This meshes well with his claim that there can be additional moral components on top of the baseline moral requirements.

To be honest, I struggled a bit with the third and fourth chapters and would like to go over them. I understand the point of chapter three--that we shouldn't allow loopholes that undermine the basis of our moral system, and that sometimes we arrange society in a way that does, in fact, undermine our moral convictions--but I'm not sure I understand the examples he gives.

The fourth chapter is good. It really focuses on the extent to which we are being hypocritical by asserting that there are basic moral requirements required in a national order but not in the global order. I don't know enough Rawls/(Daniels) to see how they would respond here, but it could be an interesting discussion I think. Is Rawls really contradicting himself, or is he merely not spending enough energy here given how large his project alread is? Or is Pogge ignoring potential points of refutation? I'd also like to go over the distinctions between contextualism/non-contextualism/universalism some.

Finally, I am compelled by his argument that the "bad leaders" argument isn't sufficient. I found the objection originally to be quite good, given that it isn't just that "it's their fault." Rather, he treats the argument well by extending it to a question of inevitability--if there are bad leaders in power, won't they just continue to steal? Insofar as we support those leaders by continuing an economic system where corporations go in and deal with dictators, we are culpable. I also never thought about the fact that we don't allow debt relief for decisions that dictators made when others came in to power. These issues really complicate the social justice questions and seem to require unique/novel answers.

Pogge

I first wanted to comment on Mike's post-I like the numbers too. It is very easy to follow! :)

At the beggining of chapter 2, Pogge writes: "Many are therefore inclined to believe that our human rights are whatever governments agree them to be."
This was very interesting because I feel like the average person in America might have the same notion of his or her rights. Of course, I have not done enough research, but when I look back to a few months ago my perception was the same. Before taking this class, if one asked me what rights I had, I would have automaticlly thought of the Constiution and rights contained inside.
Pogge then goes to explain how we came to believe we have certain moral or human rights. I really liked his explanation of "official disrespect". "Such wrongs do not merely deprive their victims of the objects of their rights, but attack those very rights themselves; they do not merely subvert what is right, but the very idea of right and justice" (59). By addressing the issue from this perspective, human rights violations are concernes of everyone. On page 63, Pogge discusses the socioeconomic factors that might aid in the violation of human rights. He writes that servants are often illiterate and ignorant to their legal rights, thus they are unable to change their situations. In order to relieve some of the problem, we should expand literacy, knowledge of existing legal rights, shelters for dismissed servants, unemolyment benefits for the poor, etc.
Although this truly sounds ideal, it does not seem plausible. Societies where this kind of servitude takes place do not seem like the ones that would give a damn about unemployment benefits and such. Servitude is most likely present in agrarian and growing economies, in placed that are in dire need of labor. The servants are aware of their poor conditions, but do not want to place themselves in worse ones by rebelling and demanding respect. Now, I wish I could miraculously propose a better way of solving this problem, but I cannot. Pogge's proposition is a good one; literacy and social improvements are always positive, but I don't think it can so easily solve the servants' problems.

Socioeconomic rights are currently and by far the most frequently unfullfiled human rights (91). Pogge claims that because of these peoples' economic powerlessness (sp), they are less likely to cause their leaders any trouble. This leaves the door wide open for further downgrade of their living conditions. How does capitalism play a role in this "mess"? I have been thinking about that throughout this book, and I can't seem to make up my mind. Even in communist societies, for example, powerty was still a large issue. Constantly there were shortages of goods, and people were lacking some common items for every day life.

I read page 97 several times. I got the chills each time, and I feel sick to my stomach. How can we be so oblivious? How can I complain?
It is depressing to see how little media coverage there is of this kind of suffering. Sure, there are books and movies about the Holocaust, Mao's Great Leap Forward and the Rawanda killings. Where are the portrayals of every day lives of people. The stories told are done so in a way that makes suffering seem like a thing of the past. The world needs to know take account of people's starvation, malnutrition, and sickness as a part of their regular lives.

THE WORLD'S 200 RICHEST PEOPLE MORE THAN DOUBLED THEIR NET WORTH IN THE FOUR YEARS TO 1998, TO MORE THAN $1 TRILLION. THE ASSETS OF THE TOP THREE BILLIONAIRES ARE MORE THAN THE COMBINED GNP OF ALL LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THEIR 600 MILLION PEOPLE.

Sunday, April 26, 2009

Pogge

There is one copy in the library and it has already been checked out. I was wondering if someone possibly had an extra Pogge book, I kind of doubt that anyone is in to buying two of the same book for a class. So I am also wondering if anyone knew a website to find it at. I will only need to borrow the book for a couple days if anyone has one, while mine arrives from amazon.com

Pogge's conceptions of human rights

Pogge really likes to use numbered lists. It seems like there are “four reasons” for everything and that each of those reasons is subdivided into its own finite list of reasons. I really like this writing style; it makes it much easier for me to stop and check my understanding.

With that said, I have a number of questions about these chapters, so I’ll jump right in.

1. Why are manifesto rights necessarily inferior rights? Pogge says that these “rhgts are somehow unrealistic or unclear about the duties they entail,” but it seems to me that many of these human rights that we are discussing in this book are will be extremely difficult to fully realize; if this is true, then some may label proponents of those rights “unrealistic” (73). As such, I’m wondering why such “unrealistic” rights are seemingly discounted. Is it just practicality, or am I missing something deeper?
2. I do like Pogge’s distinction between an interactional and institutional understanding of human rights (71). Although I’m wondering how much radical change is necessary to fully realize a system of institutional human rights. I like Pogge’s use of this concept because I’m inclined to believe that institutions are closer to the root cause of these problems; thus, it makes sense to target institutions as the way to fix the problem. I also think such a conception of human rights decentralizes responsibility to the public rather than centralizing that responsibility on government elites. However, I’m wondering if there is a tradeoff between these two conceptions of human rights? What is lost/gained with each conception of human rights?

Friday, April 24, 2009

Darfur & Poverty

An interesting link

Thursday, April 23, 2009

Pogge-further

After our class discussion today, I felt this post needed writing (unfortunately, we ran out of time before I could address the following question/issue). Pogge, most notably in his conclusion of Chapter 1, asserts that his sense of justice and flourishment is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or at least highly correlated to a degree of being quasi-synanymous.. However, I find this aspect problematic. If we look at the actual Universal Declaration of Human Rights document, it has been approved by the U.N. General Assembly. In fact, the U.N. website had this to say about the document, "Following this historic act, the Assembly called upon all Member countries to publicize the text of the Declaration and 'to cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or territories.' " (http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html). Based on this information, Pogge's point seems redundant though not irrelevant. In being adopted by the U.N. member states in 1948, I think one could reasonably argue the Declaration already does constitute an internationally recognized criteria of justice, the same thing for which Pogge's first chapter aims. Now, I would agree if Pogge is trying to say the Declaration and its ideas be adopted because they are not. My question is what proposition is he making that hasn't been achieved in terms of universal criterion for justice?

Also, on a side note, I'm disappointed nobody commented on my Dagger blog from a few classes back. Professor McCrickerd, I would welcome you to open season on that post if you are still interested!

Beginnings of Poggy

I agree with what Poggy is trying to convey at the beginning; that peoples judgments that world poverty doesn’t seem like it’s that big of a deal. It’s all the way over there, I see no need to mess with it mentality. One way of lightening the problem would be do lessen the burdens that we(I’m not sure who we is, possibly the west) have put on smaller poverty ridden countries.
One thing that I am curious to look in to is. The fact that there is poverty in the United States. If we are looking at would poverty, would starting with the united states, be beneficial or more harmful to help lessen world poverty?

Pogge

I agree with the earlier post concerning utilitarianism regarding the size of the group we are discussing. I believe any argument regarding groups becomes more difficult when the group gets larger (unless the problem is something like trying to eat 50 pizzas in 10 minutes and 15 people are participating-then it's better to have a larger group than 15). In examining the Pogge's argument thus far, it seems his aim is at measuring human flourishing in an attempt to gauge justice. His proposition to make a universal definition of justice is a noble notion but one which would be difficult to attain and maintain, if not impossible (in fact, more likely the latter). As much as I would like to see all people to agree with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the realist in me says it cannot be done. In order for such global uniformity to occur, there would need to be a catastrophic event or the rise of one world government with no state interest as a motive. I like the theory he is working on-it just can't be done, unless he has a convincing argument later to persuade me otherwise.

Wednesday, April 22, 2009

Pogge

Pogge says that “human persons are flourishing means that their lives are good, or worthwhile, in the broadest sense.”(33) What exactly is he saying concerning human flourishing? Is he building his theory off of this, by later tying universal justice to it? Or is human flourishing before justice, does justice allow one to flourish? He goes on to say what a component and means to flourishing are but he also goes on to say we must know what human flourishing consists in. Also, he makes the distinction about how one perceives human flourishing, from within or from without. At the beginning of 1.1 he basically says that, human flourishing is central to our personal, ethical, and political aspects of our lives and those lives around us. So, first, one needs to be able to flourish and then autonomy and justice fall in accord? Would he say flourishing is a capacity?

He gives four desiderata (something wanted or needed) criteria sought after for universal justice, to make the basic criteria more plausible internationally, so all countries will be on the same page, with respect to justice. I think that this is an extremely good point, and perhaps a major dividing point between countries. If all societies had the same criteria for justice, or any major moral issue for that matter, it would seem like it would be more effective with regard to action.

In 1.5 he talks about human rights and legal rights. Is one of his main worries or fears about tying human rights to legal rights, is that if they were tied together, then people of those countries would file legal claims against whoever is at fault? It seems like he is saying that human rights come first with no legal power, is that to say that human rights are more powerful then legal rights, which I think they should be, but could not be taken to court as a claim? And he goes on to say that legal rights come secondary depending upon the national constitution of the individual country. So who, if anyone, is he placing the responsibility upon when it comes to claims for human rights? I realize he thinks it is the social institutions, but what does he mean by that? Is there a specific line he is drawing, or would it be weighted according to GDP? And when he speaks of social institutions, is he talking about solely governments or more broadly?

A lot of questions, I hope we can go over most of these tomorrow to clarify some things.

Utilitarianism (If that's even how you spell it)

But doesn't it always seem like we're coming back to utilitarianism? We talk about universal criteria and such, and I hate to be the Hobbes in the room, but there will always be people that don't want to look out for anyone but themselves. When they take the #3 into their hands, about making the criteria more strict for special occasions, who's to say it won't stay that way? Who are we leaving out?

It's been proven time and time again that the larger an organization is, the less likely it will work.
I would agree with Mike that I'd like to go over both "sixes" in class.

I think Pogge is right that the way we go about stopping injustice does seem to carry some sort of moral weight. Is it a proper reading of Rawls/(Daniels) to say that his hypothetical contractors would not be able to take account of the "method" question? Also, can someone please explain to me the argument about why we owe something to those in the past?

I did find very compelling the arguments about future citizens of the planet. He frames it a new way. It no longer was merely that we are using/damaging the resources of those in the future, though this is an extremely important point. He argued that we actually shape the conceptions of the good that future people will have in virtue of the decisions we make. How we leave the world, the values we uphold, will change others lives. If we promote particular professions as important in this lifetime, for instance, it will become second nature to future generations that those lifestyles are the way to be. This is cool and frightening all wrapped up into one.

It is interesting the way Pogge puts into conversation a real world issue and a sophisticated discussion of rights. As I understand his conceptions, its more about having claims against coercive social institutions to promote some ends. Interestingly, he doesn't view legality as a necessary condition and instead argues that it might be harmful, echoing sentiments of past authors we've read. One question, though. Isn't there something about legality that gives a feel of permanence to rights? A guarantee that something will be there the next day? Now, I know that laws change and that cultural norms, for instance, can tend to last much longer. But isn't there some value to codification. Also, what constitutes a "coercive social institution?" Who all would this conception of rights give obligations to? Her argument seems very similar to Shrader-Frechette's from EJ when arguing that those who reap benefits from an unjust social order are obligated to work to "compensate" others when systems of injustice can't be easily fixed.

Kids and rights

Apparently Dager is not standard reading in elementary school. These were at the Valley West Hy-Vee, apparently elementary schools kids were asked to write about what freedom meant to them.

The first one says "Freedom to me is having a government that the people are in charge and that is called a democracy. We the people have a thing called rights, and those rights came from the government and we fight in wars to regain(?) our freedoms"



The second one says "It means I can do what I want, when I want, however I want". I thought these were a good example of how rights are perceived in everyday life. The kid who wrote the second one basically gives the simplest explanation of how rights work in the US. This is especially interesting because you can tell by the writing that the child is very young. This isn't something they came up with all on their own after contemplating the nature of rights and responsibilities. The more likely (and depressing) explanation is that this what they were taught by their parents or in school. This kid's hyper-individualized notion of rights is being rewarded by having it displayed in public.

Pogge Intro and 1

Before I began reading Pogge, I was wondering what kind of a transition I would need to make in my mind from talking about Dagger’s notion of republican liberalism to discussing world poverty and human rights. At some level, I knew that we would be discussing two very different conceptions of rights. After all, Dagger is obsessed with the idea of close-knit communities and Pogge is operating on a global scale. With that in mind, I began reading.
I found myself wondering if Pogge, in the introduction, is implicitly responding to a claim that Dagger would make. I seem to recall Dagger making the claim that we owe a special duty to our compatriots simply because they are members of our community. That, to me, seems to be the same claim that Pogge labels the “second skillful defense of our acquiescence in world poverty” starting on page 14. In other words, I’m wondering if Dagger would make the claim that “people may give priority to their compatriots, especially in the context of a system of competing states; it is permissible for us and our political representatives vigorously to pursue our interests within an adversarial system in which others and their representatives can vigorously pursue their interests” (14). It seems to me that this claim shares many ideas with Dagger (treating compatriots with priority, the idea of people organizing in small groups), but I (and I don’t have any text to back me up) don’t think that Dagger would go so far to approve acquiescence in world poverty, but I’m not sure why.
Also, I’m hoping we can spend some time in class on Thursday unpacking Pogge’s conception of harm including his six points that he claims make his conception of harm more restrictive (pg. 26) as well as his sixfold discussion of how institutions relate to human flourishing (pg. 47-48). I have a feeling that these points are important to understanding the larger point that he makes about harm (and his use of the term in general) as well as his institutional conception of human rights, so I think it may well be worth our time.

Tuesday, April 21, 2009

Conclusions of Civic Virtues - Richard Dagger

Overall, I do appreciate Dagger’s argument in this book. However, I was confused by a couple of things in Chapter 11. As to the first challenge presented to republican liberalism that he discusses, that republican liberalism is hostile to cultural pluralism because it imposes homogeneity by ignoring differences among groups of people, I did not feel, from my understanding of the text, that Dagger addresses this point adequately. His response to this objection is to criticize this view by arguing that republican liberalism is superior to Young’s “politics of difference”. I did not see how criticizing “politics of difference” shows that republican liberalism is not hostile to cultural pluralism. Although, he does state that “The weakness of her theory does not guarantee the strength of mine in this regard” (180). So further, he aims to show that republican liberalism is more hospitable to difference than Young’s criticism suggests. In addressing this, he depends upon his previous discussion of autonomy and fair play. I understand his argument about how autonomy is something that can be developed only with the help and cooperation of others. How does this exactly contribute to difference, though? Does the cooperation of others not lead, in a sense, to homogeneity? Not homogeneity in the sense that we all become the same but in the sense that we all need to compromise toward certain similar or shared goals. I can see how this relates to respecting group differences, as he discusses in his recalling of the fair play argument on page 181, but does respecting group differences necessarily equate to recognizing all of the differences?

Monday, April 20, 2009

Republican Liberalism

I have to agree Dragger concept of Republican Liberalism. On page 179, he quote, “Republican Liberalism encourages people to search for a common ground by acting as citizens; the politics of difference tells them to ‘stand in different social locations,’ which leads directly to “stalled decisionmaking.” Even though, this might be a theory and people can argue that this cannot work or cannot exist, this theory of Republican Liberalism seems to be better than what we currently have, which is, the idea of a single republican is or libertarian. Both of these two, lacks the other characteristics of what it means to be a citizen. Republican Liberalism is a theory, if not, the ideal identity of a citizen. A common ground or goal within individuals or community seems to be better than the idea of an individual, only caring about him/herself or a person, who more value in others than him/herself.

Dagger

How does he suggest we attain a successful balancing act between individuals and groups? On page 181 he writes, “If respecting group differences helps to instill a sense of fair play and cooperation in people, then republican liberals will gladly respect the difference.” When does respecting a group’s interest require one to set their interest aside for the betterment of society?

Also, is this theory put forth as an ideal (Ideal meaning end all say all, but embracing the fact that no theory will have an answer to all of life’s problems) political theory? Is every theory put forth as ideal? I realize he says throughout the book that this theory will not have an answer to all the problems, but so much of it relies on how people are, when in reality people aren’t like this. And again I realize he sees this problem, but it just seems like he put forth a theory, tied a lot of things nicely together, put some suggestions on how to instill certain aspects of this theory; but how does he suggest that this theory be brought forth? Because it seems like we can work on parts of this theory, such as community, but by cultivating one part isn’t going to set the rest of the theory into practice. I like the theory very much, but I haven’t read too many political theories, so maybe that is it. It seems like it takes into account a lot of fundamental principles and concepts of a good society, but is that all it is, is a theory with a few suggestions throughout the book saying this may work, but im not even sure if it will work? Because if it is that, then it just seems like a nice little book, with an “idea” of how society should be.

just pulling everything together

I know this wont make sense to most that read this because i am addressing an article from paths to knowledge but I have to say it...I think this book is proof that philosophy can be seductive because I feel pretty seduced by this book now that we are done.
Having said that I can get into what I thought of these last few chapters. When basically pulling his argument together to give a big picture look at what he had been doing and fill in a few spots that had not been perfectly clear Dagger's concept of how autonomy and civic virtue work really sank home. The notion that to respect right is not merely to assert them but to have a desire to protect other people's rights and treat other people in a way where you are not using them or being used by them in a way that changes the balance away from the equality of all persons really allowed for a clearer understanding for my of what it is that civic virtue is doing when he had been explaining that a community with civic virtue helps foster autonomy. It was also helpful to clarify that autonomy is not something we are trying to maximize or even the only right that matters in his system. Instead his system tries to raise everyone to a certain threshold of autonomy and that we address autonomy because it is the building block of other equally valuable things in society.
I have a few questions and not a lot of answers based on this reading. I would like to address Mike's post first, though. I think the "what has gone wrong" question is Sure, you are right that this book is based on some of the same basic premises that our government was founded on. Glendon was a description of how we've strayed. This is an explanation of how we can go back.

I have two questions based on the reading that I'm genuinely confused about. First, is it just me or does Dagger seem sort of flippant towards the diversity problem? He is thorough in his response to Young, though I don't think he was very generous (from my limited familiarity with her work). Can anybody more familiar with her work respond? I know her work is sort of extreme in terms of "solutions," but it seems like the discussion could go deeper.

Moreover,it seems like he is setting up a straw man by spending so much time on her argument. I don't see him attending to any of the interesting questions involved in pluralism from my perspective (things I've brought up in other posts). All he says is that pluralism shares some values with republican liberalism. How does it deal with the more interesting questions of diversity? Admittedly, this could be an issue of him using more abstract language and not really delving into particular examples. I'd just like to go over his arguments tomorrow.

Second, can someone explain to me the importance of the second question? I guess I don't see the question (particularly involving Rawls) as contentious. Where Dagger's argument is more belabored, I find it more intuitive. I guess I'd like to go over this more too.

Dagger and Fed 10

I liked the ending to Dagger’s book, but, as I was reading the last few pages and thinking about our discussions in class over the last week or so, I’m wondering what the big take-away point is for Dagger. On the one hand, we know from the first chapter that his formal thesis is simply to recognize that republican liberalism is feasible, and it seems like he has done that. However, his book has a very “practical” bent to it; he seems intent on offering practical solutions that can improve the quality of life in America. So, I’m wondering what Dagger would say that we can take away from the book.
It seems to me that what Dagger has been overwhelmingly concerned with throughout the book has been battling nonparticipation. Through his discussions of education, instant direct democracy, and even local neighborhood organizations in the last chapter, Dagger has consistently argued that individuals need to be more involved in the community. This increased participation, he seems to argue, would lead to a greater sense of community, which, in turn, would lead to a stronger system of government.
Assuming the above to be at least partially correct, I’m left wondering by his last two main points. First, Dagger says that individuals should be empowered to join groups. Second, he says that the power of the groups must be managed so no group becomes overly powerful. With this in mind, I’m left thinking about Madison’s Federalist #10 which deals with exactly those same issues. Madison’s conclusion is that the only way to manage the power of faction is to create a society in which groups can prosper and control each other’s power. That idea is, allegedly, incorporated into our political system.
So, I’m left with a bit of a paradox. We live in a system of government founded on the idea that groups should be empowered and, 200 years later, we’re reading a book that says that groups should be empowered. What happened? It doesn’t seem that the main idea has changed, but it seems that our government has not lived up to that ideal. What are we doing wrong?

Sunday, April 19, 2009

The end of Dagger

I really enjoyed the last chapter of Civic Virtues. In chapter 12, Dagger concludes his arguements about republican liberalism, and civic virtues. "Republican liberalism seeks to promote and cultivate, but not to maxime, certain virtues." He goes on to say that it is important to bring as many individuals to the same treshold, not maximize vritues in a group of few.
I found it very interesting to see his blending of virtues, and their different sources in society. Dagger incorporates different ideals, from classical to Christian virtues, and ends with a list of six vitues that republican liberalism should promote. He states that a republican liberal is one who : respects individual rights, values autonomy, tolerates different opinions and beliefs, plays fair, cherishes civic memory, and takes an active part in the life of the community.
Although these are important ideals, it is perhaps more important and interesting to see how they relate and work together. For example, Dagger explains that one of the reasons to tolerate those with whom one disagrees is because one hopes that they will do the same. This is directly tied to playing fair and reciprocity. Because these virtues are easily exercied together, it more appealing to strive and achieve this behavior.
Dagger further explains the importance of civil society. It is needed to serve as an intermediary between the public and private lives of citizens, and to help them incorporate one and the other. Dagger explains the importance of a civil society from a republican and liberal standpoint. On one hand, it is important to appreciate the rights and interests of others and their autonomy. On the other hand, a civil society must promote civic responsiblity and common good.

I would like to say (to Prof. McCrickerd), that I really like the order of books we have had. Especially because Dagger concluded his book by addressing the proliferation of "rights-talk".

"To appreciate rights is to understand that they are as valuable for the way they connect us to as for the way they protect us from one another."

Thursday, April 16, 2009

Instant Direct Democracy

It is all well and good to say that voter apathy will go away if we just put some kind of a voting/polling station within every American's homes; what if voter apathy is a bigger deal than just people not being able to get to a polling station within a given time. I mean Drake has vote of what not over the Internet and I've only voted in one election and there has to have been like 25 times that I could have voted for different stuff this year.

If instant Direct Democracy were to be implamented I feel that JMc's -grauge door openner, cell phone, ipod theory. Would become more true. In Iowa we have caucuses, instant direct democracy no need for that any more.

The Tyranny of Traffic Laws

I understand that it would be better for all if all of us were to have some sort of agreed upon rules for driving, but I think that these are the sorts of things that should be voluntary, not mandatory. That is, we shouldn’t be fined or otherwise penalized for not doing what’s in the best interest of all. Society forcing me to drive in a particular way (e.g., on a particular side of the road, at a particular speed, stopping and going in particular places and on particular signals, etc.) just so everyone benefits is a violation of my right to autonomy, to make my own choices. Of course, if I ever hurt anyone I should be penalized, but any laws that mandate that I behave in any way beyond not directly harming foists upon me demands that cannot be legitimately foisted upon me by the larger majority. Anyone can choose to do what they want but no one should be coerced to do anything beyond not directly harm.

Wednesday, April 15, 2009

Dagger-Voting

I would have to agree with Dagger’s idea about compulsory voting and self-resignation. If it is a citizen’s duty, according to Dagger, to vote to become politically involve in their community and remain us of rights about voting, then I think it would be necessary to, not necessarily force, but discipline people to vote. In my point of view, I think our government leaves us with a lot of options to choose between what we, each individually, want. Once we find what we want, we usually stay and only stay on that realm of our personal needs, disregarding anything else that would makes us doubt or change our personal needs and beliefs. Therefore, by leaving to the choice to vote or not, or giving us the sole responsibility to vote, gives us the decision if voting is even part of our personal interests. And from what I got from Dagger, I get the feeling that the people don’t care voting because it is not part of their lives or interests. Therefore, people don’t vote and don’t perform their duties to the community, in which they benefit from. Thus, I understand, and Dagger would say, that they are “free riders.”
Overall, I would have to disagree with Dagger’s method in making people voting through legal meanings. Punishing or fining people for not voting seems repressive and it leaves room of people to resist. I would argue that discipline people to voting or be actively involved in the political system of the community is better than that to force people to vote or punishing them for no doing so.

Dagger 9 & 10

Instant direct democracy would separate citizens more; it would seem to fit more on the liberal side of the argument. And ultimately Dagger does say that it would not be compatible with Republican-liberalism. Compulsory voting also seems to lose the sense of obligation or duty republican-liberalism is trying to impose amongst citizens. The two options I think would be most appealing would either be automatic voter registration or compulsory voter registration. Automatic voter registration might be handy and get people to the polls especially if people tend to move around a lot, make the automatic registration a nationwide registration and not just a state registration somehow. I like compulsory voter registration, because it would be much like registering for selective service. It gets young adults to go out and do something that is a duty to do, but then they choose if they want to vote or not. I think it would be a very good idea to coincide the two registrations with one another, selective service and voter registration.

The sketch of his “ideal” city seems a bit on the fantasy side. I would agree however, about the better cities citizen wise is between 10,000-250,000 range, I think this may be a bit broad though. I grew up in a town of about 25,000 and knew quite a few people; it had that sense of a community. Almost anywhere I went I knew someone I knew. I then moved to a town of about 150,000 and lived there for about a year and a half, there I did not know as many people, but being that I did not grow up there could be one reason why. Another might be that i pretty much only went to school, work and church. But even at that I only got to know the people I would see at those places and very rarely would see those people around town. Thus far, living in Des Moines, it has that bigger city feeling to it. It definitely feels bigger than the previous cities, just from the aspect of knowing people. The smaller the city from my experience, there is a better sense of a community.

Perhaps I missed it, but does he talk about how to stop people from moving around? Because one of his points is civic memory and this would be absent if one has no memory or no sense of belonging within a city.

goodbye apathy

I found chapter nine interesting because of the concept of apathy or indifference in regards to political participation. Dagger list some reasons why apathy should not be 'fixed'. For example "(apathy) may simply indicate that the members of the electorate are content with the situation in which they find their polity and themselves" (pg 133). This in particular resonated with me considering the record turnout this last election and all the problems that fueled this past election. The second argument basically states that as long as enough people vote then every thing works out, except for defining what "enough" is. The last argument I find most convincing, that being, that "relatively high levels of indifference among an electorate are desirable and perhaps even necessary to ensure the health of a democracy" (pg 134).

Being that apathy IS a problem for Dagger, he considers ways to combat apathy. One example he gives is Instant Direct Democracy. Instant Direct Democracy in a nut shell (from my understanding) is basically where each citizen votes on pretty much everything from the comfort of their home. At first glance this seems like a nice idea. In this concept of government there is less under/over representation as well as less influence by interest groups. However, there are some disadvantages as well. Disadvantages like the fact that most people are in one way or another incorrectly informed about political issues. This model runs the threat of requiring too much of the average joe, at least in a political sense some would argue.

Dismissing Instand Direct Democracy Dagger shifts focus on another possible means of combatting apathy. He suggest making voting mandatory, making voting registration automatic, or making voting registration a requirement. Ultimately, I find that the last option is the best, or the best of the three at least. Here we create political awareness to a small degree and still preserve the ability to vote or not to vote.

Ultimately, I'm struggeling to place apathy in the category of disease (my words, not Daggers). Perhaps that is the liberal side of me overpowering the republican side. Just like the third appeal to apathy, I feel that apathy is a part of democracy. Democracy is a government forged by the people and their expressing their opinion. Why does apathy get such a bad rap? As Sarte said "If you don't choose, you have chosen not to choose." I'm trying to understand perhaps that Dagger does not say apathy is bad, only that it is not a productive element of republican liberalism. Thoughts anyone...or perhaps not?

Dagger on Political Participation

The chapter on political participation was very disappointing to me. Dagger is a political scientist, and the problems that he discusses in the chapter are those that others in his discipline have studied without ceasing for decades. In particular, there are a wide variety of studies on the causes of political participation from which Dagger could have drawn to support and to vet his argument. In particular, his critique of voter efficacy (the idea that people are reluctant to vote because the doubt that their vote matters) simply pushed the issue aside when it has been a major area of contention in the field for a while.
Even more frustrating was his continual conflation of topics. Two were particularly frustrating to me. First, he asserted that direct democracy would (in theory) be good because it would treat every voter equally (I know he eventually rejects the entire direct democracy argument, but I find it frustrating that he is appealing to an incorrect characterization of the American political system to make his argument). Our system of government was specifically founded upon the idea that not every voter is to be treated equally. Our government is founded upon a dual system of equality: one house of Congress treats citizens as equals and the other house treats states as equals. The point of the American political system was never to treat every citizen as an equal (indeed, that is part of the reason why senators were not initially popularly elected). Dagger’s idea of direct democracy, then, would do more than change the mechanism of voting; it would change the fundamental fabric of our political system. Second, he completely underestimates the complexity of the legislative process. He provides a vague description of an “Agenda committee” that would, theoretically, choose which proposals are available to the public. It is hard to imagine how individuals would acquire the necessary expertise to properly draft legislation to govern one of the strongest countries in the world without education and training; if Dagger’s solution is to rely on some type of congressional staffers (which is what we do now), then he is removing power from the popularly elected individuals on the Agenda committee and placing power in the hands of these unelected staffers because the Agenda committee (without knowledge of the intricate process of legislation) would more than likely defer to the expertise of the staffer.
Dagger’s preferred solutions to the participation dilemma are compulsory voting and compulsory registration. To support his argument in favor of compulsory voting, he cites statistics from other countries. However, I find it hard to believe that such statistics would be necessarily applicable in the United States; every country is composed of a delicate balance of factors (size, level of political involvement other than voting, number of elections, etc.) that determine a nation’s political culture, and it seems unlikely just because something will work in the United States simply because it was successful in another country under vastly different circumstances. Second, Dagger seems to completely overestimate the barriers to voter registration. While I’m not familiar with voter registration processes nationwide, I know that the nationwide trend is toward the acceptance of same-day voter registration. It seems that, in a few years, voter registration will become obsolete as a separate process; individuals who had not previously registered will simply fill out a short form when the go to the polls. Also, this trend is seemingly being publicized. Think back to the publicity surrounding the Iowa caucuses (which, because of their closed-party status, are more “elite” institutions than general elections). The candidates from both parties went to great lengths to inform the public about same-day registration. As such, I find Dagger’s claim that compulsory registration would increase voter turnout to be largely unconvincing.
These were two interesting chapters that I know answered a lot of questions I have about republican liberalism. Dagger makes several clear, practical (insofar as they are things that could conceivably be done) suggestions that helped me understand where he's coming from. As a caveat, much of the criticism I think would be relevant to his argument is based in concern over cultural pluralism/immigration/etc., but I'll hold off on those questions til we get to his defense.

The question of apathy is interesting. As Jasmine brought up in class on Monday and Dagger echoes here, sometimes apathy can be a good thing--particularly in a world with large numbers of uninformed voters. I'm surprised by the small amount of time he spends responding to these arguments; he merely notes that we can't accurately measure preferences and and that low voter turnout decreases the perceived legitimacy of elections. I don't mean to downplay the importance of these arguments, I was just surprised based on how thorough he is elsewhere that he would be so brief too. I think his best argument is an indirect one made later on: that the benefits we associated with apathy (removing those who don't care from the pool of voters) are less likely to be a problem in a world where voter turnout is increased. That was unclear I think. I mean to say that if more people vote (through, say, compulsory voting) people will likely feel the need to be more informed and thereby do so.

Although maybe not a central concern of republican liberalism, the big argument I have in favor of compulsory voting are the potential effects it can have on poverty. Studies indicate that countries that institute compulsory voting see decreased levels of poverty. This makes sense conceptually, given that the lower class tends to vote less frequently and, when they begin to vote, politicians then have to consider their interests. We would be remiss to separate republican liberalism from equality, so this argument could be given in support of his discussion.

On the second chapter, I have only a few comments now but a lot I'd like to discuss in more detail tomorrow. First, isn't it fascinating that as the avenues for communication have supposedly opened up we seem to know less and less about each other? While there is a ton of statistical evidence, one need only think anecdotally to come to this conclusion. We've discussed this some in class, but as I reflect, I can't believe how astoundingly isolated I've become from large groups of people that, in past times, would have been regular conversation partners. I don't think I have a distaste for them or anything, but instead that its so easy to be alone. Interesting.

Second, and this sort of hints at my concerns about pluralism, which groups would be effected in the best and worst ways by Dagger's suggestions? Who gets the most and least benefit? To ask the Rawlsian question, does it work to advantage the worst off in society compared to where they would be otherwise?

Side Note

I was watching the Colbert Report while diligently doing homework for the week, and Justice Thomas was mentioned on the show concerning a recent speech. Colbert summarized the speech as dealing with what Thomas called a "proliferation of rights." Colbert also briefly discussed the Justice's concern with differentiation between obligations and duties and the role those terms and others play in rights discourse. I thought it was interesting and pertinent that this story came through on, of all shows, the Colbert Report. Just thought it was good to share considering the Wellman book and other readings from this semester.

Tuesday, April 14, 2009

Dagger Re-visited

Hopefully I can address some of the issues I failed to in class. However, I want to first clarify that I do not necessarily believe the arguments I'm going to present--I just think that Dagger doesn't address them sufficiently.

First, I turn to the issue of legal status of citizenship as discussed today in class. Many people seemed to want to argue that Dagger was insisting on the social aspect of citizenship, especially relating to the role of a citizen in his/her community. On page 99, though, Dagger affirms that citizenship as a matter of legal status is necessary to his concept of republican liberalism (or, in other words, the legal and social can't necessarily be separated in terms of citizenship). He also affirms that citizenship can simply be a matter of legal status and nothing more. This latter point is the one I was aiming at in my previous post.

Unfortunately for my argument, there are many compelling aspects to Dagger's republican liberalism. If we accept Dagger's republican liberalism claim, though, problems quickly arise. These problems are some, but certainly not all, of the arguments conceivable against republican liberalism's concept, especially regarding the legal status vs. social status of citizenship.

First, consider Dagger's requirements for a true and real citizen: "A true citizen will take an active part in public life, and this activity must involve more than an occasional trip to the polling place." (p. 100) and "For a republican liberal, however, the real citizen is one who acts with the common good in mind." (p. 100) We can also look at page 101 of Dagger, where he says: "Citizenship thus requires that we think of ourselves as something more than the sum of the roles we play." It would logically follow, then, that Dagger is arguing increased activity/involvement makes people better citizens, or at least means they better fulfill the role of citizenry. While on the surface this argument seems sound on the surface, a focused examination reveals several weaknesses. One specific example that would undermine Dagger's view is looking at Nazi Germany and its citizenry. German citizens who actively participated in the Nazi regime, under Dagger's view of participation in multiple facets for the societal consensus of good, were arguably fulfilling their citizenship requirement at that time in Germany. However, I think very few people today would argue that those citizens were acting in a way that correlates with "true citizenship," but doesn't that only prove the term "citizenship" is subjective? Those citizens clearly believed they were acting as citizens should to benefit the greater good of the society they envisioned. This subjectivity which republican liberalism would seem to encourage can be avoided with accepting citizenship as simply a legal status instead of an integration of legal and social statuses.

My second criticism of Dagger deals with the existence of choice as citizens. If we are supposed to have an obligation to others in our community within our role as citizens, why is the choice to not participate in our community included, whether legally or as a social standard? Some may argue the ability to not participate stems from some idea of the natural right to choose or that it is in line with democracy to not be forced to do/believe certain things. However, I offer a different view: we are given the choice to not participate because, on occasion, not participating is itself a form of democratic participation/citizenship. For example, look at countries in Africa or the country of Venezuela where elections have been flawed by cheating on the part of the current ruling power (individual or group). If we consider that large collectives in these countries have refused to follow government action by not voting nor following government action, few would argue those collectives are acting in violation of their role as citizen. However, at the same time, abstaining from active participation seems to contradict Dagger's view.

I admit that I could quite easily be missing some of Dagger's argument in trying to flush out my arguments, but I hope people reading this will at least contemplate/build upon the arguments I'm trying to present here. Although I would argue Dagger's idea of citizenship through republican liberalism is insufficient due to the problems explained above (as well as those not mentioned or thought of by this author), I have not taken the time to examine how the legal status of citizenship would be able to stand on its own. The only thing that jumps to mind is the level of objectivity a legal status entails, compared to the subjective use of the term citizenship which republican liberalism requires.

Dagger

In the following chapter, Dagger goes on to explain the problems of apathy and how they play a role in a consumer model of democracy as well as republican liberalism. In the consumer model, voting is seen as a way to pursue one's interests and preferences, and he claims that low turnout can blurr those preferences. On the other side, republican liberalism and apathy are at odds because civic participation and community involvement are essential to the idea of republican liberalism. Dagger then goes on to give the example/possiblity of Instant Direct Democracy. It is very interesting to see how he explains the process. I have to agree with him that this might be conceivable, but not desirable. Although the idea effective and it would provide for most participation, it would take away from the greater benefits that come with participation such as duscourse, discussion and interaction with others. One of the disadvatanges of this system is the inablity of people to understand the complexity of issues and their effects. This reminds me of Jasmine's point today, how some should't vote because they do not have the skills, etc. I don't think Dagger would go as far as Jasmine, but he claims that this direct democracy would give the change for the ill-informed and misinformed to have the same kind of voice as those that have more knowledge of the issues. This may be a disastrous idea. Overall, Dagger uses these disadvantages to prove his larger point. He claims that this kind of instant direct democracy discourages active, public-spirited citizenship, which he claims essential to republican liberalism.

Dagger further talks about compulsory voting. This part I found very interesting. There are countries such as Italy and Australia that follow this model, and their turnouts are very high. In the view of republicansim, Dagger claims, this is a great idea. There are several problems with compulsory voting, such as the restriction on the freedom of the individual. For liberal republicansim to succeed, there has to be a balance, and compulsory voting tips the scale away from the liberal side. He does introduce a possible mediating option, and that is compulsory registration. "The citizen will have a duty to register...but a right to vote." I like this idea; it seems to be the middle ground. By having compulsory registration, there will be emphasis on the importance of civic duty, yet it will not be forced. Dagges claims that those who register themselves, as opposed to those that are registered by the govt., are more likely to vote. Why hasn't the US enacted something similar? It is scary to see how low our turnouts are.

Dagger 6-8

I take issue mainly with the idea that the legal status is insufficient for citizens. The argument about increased voting presented by Dagger on p. 99-100 seems to have valid points, yet invalid ones. If we look at any European country with higher voter turnout, what is the main differences between the U.S. election process and that country's? The most significant answer is that European countries with high voter turnout have much smaller populations, allowing candidates to gain a greater feeling of personal relation with individuals. I'm not for sure, but I believe voter turnout in opening states like Iowa and New Hampshire may be higher than other states in the U.S. percentage-wise, due to the attention candidates give those states. This is similar to some European countries, in that a candidate may only have to spend time campaigning among 10-25 million people, compared to the 300 million+ in the U.S. I think Dagger should have left this out of his argument.
Still, the legal status being insufficient is questionable. By moving into the ethical dimension of citizenship, it could be said that citizenship loses its objectivity. Some may argue this undermines the legal status position, as the law is supposed to be, in principle, objective rather than subjective. I'm not saying I disagree with Dagger, but I think he has failed to flush out some of his argument...

Iowa Core Cirriculum echoes Dagger

While I was reading the education chapter, it seems like Dagger wants the civic virtues criteria in all the classes instead of just one. As a side note, the new Iowa Core Cirriculum does that by making each grade required to integrate certain aspects of the Iowa definition of "civic virtues" into their teaching methods. For example, the kindergartners will now be learning the basic set up of the united states governement.

They are also going to be defining rights and responsibilites, or as they put it, "Understand the basic concepts of government and democracy and that the U.S. Constitution defines the rights and responsibilities of citizens."

Monday, April 13, 2009

Dagger 6 - 8

From reciprocity and fair play in previous chapters, Dagger continues to connect autonomy to the two principles. In part two on Citizenship, Dagger starts to draw largely on Rousseau‘s theory of republican liberalism. Social contract comes up in this section, along with the republican commitment to civic virtue.

One question that comes to mind right away when reading this chapter is, if the private will’s desire is cultivated to act in accordance with the general will, would there still be a division between the two wills? Because if one of Rousseau’s tasks is to find ways to secure the general will, and one of his suggestions is to “cultivate the desire to act in accordance with the general will.”(84) Is he talking about the desire of the private will or am I just implying that he is? If he isn’t, what is the distinction that is being drawn here? It seems to me that if the desire (private will?) is cultivated to act in accordance with the general then they would be the same and there would not be any distinction. Also, what specific types of desires would each ‘will’ hold?

Rousseau separates freedom into three kinds: natural, civil, and moral. He goes on to talk about how if one were to enter into social contract they may surrender their natural freedom but gain civil freedom and the opportunity for moral freedom. What would be the driving force behind wanting to give up one’s natural freedom? It sort of goes back to what we were talking about in class last Thursday, what if someone wanted to just live on their own and not be part of a society, would they have to be forced to be civically free and at the same time be forced to give up their natural freedom, for the possibility of moral freedom? It seems to me that if someone is forced to give up their natural freedom then that would be a violation of some right (?) that would undermine the goal they are trying to reach. Is civic freedom more important than natural freedom? Maybe I am misinterpreting natural freedom and am way off, thoughts anyone?

The assurance game seems to me to be very individualistic. Is this a correct conclusion to draw from it? People will only act cooperatively if they have assurance that others to will cooperate and if others don’t then their motive is gone, because they were looking forward to the benefits from the assurance game rather than sole cooperation for the common good.

Chapter seven got a little confusing with how he was connecting things, if we could over this in class, just briefly that would be helpful.

5 steps toward a Practical Philosophy?

In the last of today's chapters, Dagger begins shifting his focus toward the practical capabilities of republican liberalism. Dagger suggest new ways to foster citizenship (pg 98). Dagger goes on throughout the chapter to list five concepts that need some consideration/review. Those five concepts being size, stability, fairness, communication, and lastly participation. "Together they suggest the difficulty of the task in a world in which states are growing larger, populations more mobile, traditions less secure (pg 116). My question is why these five characteristics and not other, more, or less characteristics?
I'd just like to note that, for once, there is a collective action problem.

Is Rousseau reading Kant? It sure seems like it based on a lot of the stuff here, and the author makes note of several similarities.

One question has been bugging me. I understand, I think, the different ways in which Dagger draws republicanism and liberalism together. I'm even beginning to like much of what he has to say. My question is what one who wishes to defend the distinction between these two concepts would say in answer to him. Is there some value in understanding the theories in opposition (or, at least, not together) or is there some meaning lost with the way he characterizes each?

The first chapter was pretty interesting, and I think I have a better understanding of Rousseau's position (though I'd like to go over general vs practical will in class). It does seem like much of what Rousseau says gets lost in context of our society, though, so I'm glad the next to chapters grounded his argument in our current context.

Part of me got sentimental when reading these chapters--actually, I'm not sure the word is sentimental--but I got a feeling of longing for the kind of society Dagger describes. Society really is compartmentalized now and, in many ways, devoid of real meaning. At the very least, its quite hard to find. We don't have a common purpose in American society that we can all (or most of us) wake up and think we're working towards. I think this has a significant effect on the way we treat each other/our feelings about obligations, which is something Glendon discussed extensively.

I certainly don't long for the consumer model in the same way, but that seems to be where we are. The consumer model does have its advantages--most pressing for me, increased options and the ability to avoid those we don't like--but I think I could sacrifice that for a closer, more tight knit society. One concern I have (and one that came up during the chapter on education) is whether smaller societies tend to have more problems with diversity. Same with smaller schools. My intuition is to say yes, but I didn't read any convincing evidence either way in CH. 8.

Similarly, what would a shift to republican liberalism entail for our largely immigrant country? Would entail increased border control? One issue he raised was that communities need to remain relatively stable; do immigrant populations tend to stay settled for long periods? I guess my biggest obstacle to wholeheartedly endorsing what we've read is diversity. Would society be less (or more?) diverse in a world of republican liberalism?

Could we discuss his position in the last paragraph on 117 where he tries to combine what appears to be virtue theory and autonomy? Does he want it to be like virtue theory except that we think about it instead of it being second nature? Does that conflict with the very nature of virtue theory?

Dagger on Rousseau

Dagger believes that Rousseau is a great example of Republican-Liberalism because of his use of the social contract to defend civic virtue rather than the typical argument to show individual rights. His argument is that Rousseau clearly shows civic virtue in his concept of the general will which we have as being a citizen which is apart of a collective rather than our personal will which we have because we are individuals but while doing this still allows for personal freedom as well. Rousseau's depiction of individual rights comes as moral freedom and civic freedom. Dagger claims that these hold that a citizen is only responsible to herself in this society but it is the self that is a citizen and not the self in nature. The self in nature has been given up in order to pursue the self that is a citizen and the freedoms that go along with it. However, to have these freedoms as a citizen one must pursue the general will rather than the personal will in order for the rest of society to benefit as well. So autonomy comes from being subject only to the one's self and able to live how they choose provided it does not violate their role as a citizen (which where they get their freedoms from) that is subject to the general will.

Perhaps a slight detour

For those of you who don't know, I'm a Supreme Court buff. So, I was reading Adam Liptak's (the New York Times's Supreme Court reporter) column about a recent appearance by Justice Thomas when I noticed that some of Thomas's comments matched almost exactly with our class discussion. So, in lieu of posting on Dagger for Tuesday's class, I thought I'd take a slight detour to Thomas and see if perhaps we can draw some interesting connections between Dagger, Glendon, and Thomas either here on the blog or in class tomorrow.

The gist of the article (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/us/14bar.html?_r=1&hp) is as follows: Thomas spoke to a group of essay contest winners during a dinner sponsored by the Bill of Rights Institute. Liptak quotes him as saying the following:

The evening was devoted to the Bill of Rights, but Justice Thomas did not embrace the document, and he proposed a couple of alternatives.

‘Today there is much focus on our rights,” Justice Thomas said. “Indeed, I think there is a proliferation of rights.”

“I am often surprised by the virtual nobility that seems to be accorded those with grievances,” he said. “Shouldn’t there at least be equal time for our Bill of Obligations and our Bill of Responsibilities?”

He gave examples: “It seems that many have come to think that each of us is owed prosperity and a certain standard of living. They’re owed air conditioning, cars, telephones, televisions.”

Those are luxuries, Justice Thomas said.


So, it seems that Thomas would agree with Glendon. To both Thomas and Glendon, we are experiencing a proliferation of rights at the expense of civic duty or responsibility. My questions are these: does Thomas add anything to this conversation? Are the facts that he is speaking as a Supreme Court Justice or the fact that he is speaking to an audience of high school students significant? If so, how?

Wednesday, April 8, 2009

Some more Dagger

Thus far in Civic Virtues, I have been able to understand Dagger's goals and arguements. In chapter 4, I am beggining to lose sight of his ties between autonomy and liberalism, with community and republicanism. I do understand the actual points that he is making, but I would like us to dicuss how they tie in with his larger arguement in class. On page 54, there is a passage that sheds some light, but others' insight would be great.
"..the value of rights, liberty, and autonomy can only be grounded in and sustained by a community or culture that enables the individual to develop his or her capacity of choice." But in doing so, one would only see the value of community as instrumental, which is something that Dagger argues against.


Many believe that the needs of our fellow citizens should be taken into regard first, but Dagger explains how foreigners' needs sometimes can trump those of the people closer to us. I really like his explanation of human rights, and how one should see them as adjacent to universal autonomy. If one believes in autonomy, than one will have to believe that basic human rights need to be respected in order to achieve that autonomy. On page 43, he dicusses about the "equality of all things", and how that affects who should get our aid first. Does this mean that, for example, if we are to send hearing aids overseas, we should first make sure that our fellow citizens and citizens of the recieving country are fed and healthy? How do we discern what situations take precedent if all things are equal? Does community matter most?
I did not quite understand the discussion about psychological ability to deal with the problems of the whole world. He writes: "In short, we should give our fellow citizens priority for the simple reason that our psychological limitations will not allow us to do otherwise." Is this Dagger speaking, or is he stating others' views?
I feel like Dagger's actual view is more expressed on some of the following pages where he states" The arguement from efficiency presumably requires us to balance the good we can do against the costs we incur while doing it, and in this case it seems that the citizen would not take priority. Important as it is, efficiency is not enough to establish priority of compatriots" (45).
He also argues for reciprocity and fair play which people enter into when entering societies and social contracts. If one is going to benefit from products of society, it is one's duty to contribute to the making of those products.

Dagger 4-5

In the beginning of chapter 4, Dagger (it seems to me) is attempting a task very similar to that of Thomson. Both authors attempt to determine under what circumstances rights can be overridden or how to deal with a conflict of rights. As we read, Thomson utilized the trolley example to set forth her explanation for how to deal with a conflict of rights, and Dagger deals with arguments of necessity, efficiency, side effects, and reciprocity in an attempt to deal with a similar question (although, for Dagger, the question does not deal with the ordering of individual rights but instead with organizing the rights of citizens against noncitizens). My question is this: what would Dagger say to Thomson, and what would Thomson say to Dagger? Are the ideas that each author espouses compatible, or are they entirely different? Are their any similarities between their positions?

Also, when discussing the argument for efficiency, Dagger writes: "We know that there are men, women, and children in this world who are living, and dying, in desperate poverty. We also know that we can take some steps to help them. And if my account of the right of the right of autonomy is correct, we know too, that we have a responsibility to go to their aid" (44). If this (the idea that the fundamental right to autonomy requires us to aid others in need) is true, how does Dagger explain individuals who are ignorant about genocide, poverty, etc. or individuals who know about these problems, have the means to assist, and decline to help? Would Dagger say that these individuals are refusing to recognize the duty that comes with the right to autonomy, would he say that they are simply not recognizing the right to autonomy, or would he say something completely different?

Dagger 4 & 5

Dagger starts out with chapter four by saying that autonomy is a human right regardless of race, nationality, or citizenship and goes to suggest that human rights may be neutral in this respect. But he wants to argue that there is a special relationship between members of a community and members in the same society take priority over others not part of that political community. He explores four ways to justify giving preference to members in the same political community over people who are not part of that political community. The first three arguments he looks are, the argument from necessity, the argument from efficiency and the argument from side effects, all of which in some way miss the point or fail to justify giving priority to fellow citizens. The forth argument, the argument from reciprocity, he successfully, at least from his account, ties autonomy to community bonds. And here he draws on the notion of fair play, by saying first, “political order typically provides benefits for those who belong to it.”(47and second, “qua cooperative enterprise.”(47) So basically we owe preference to fellow citizens because by following the rules of fair play, a community can strive toward fulfilling each other’s interest and cooperate within society to function within a society well.

I personally like the theory of fair play, it’s like we give and we take. But not everyone gives at the same time nor does everyone take at the same time. And he goes on to say that even though some people don’t play fair within a society, since the majority of people do (say pay taxes), the people who do not pay taxes will not bring the downfall of a political community. So basically what he wanted to do in chapter four, or at least what I got from it was, tie autonomy to community and he was able to do this by tying autonomy to human rights, and defended giving preference to members of the same political society, even though autonomy is a human right. The defense was what I was going through already, argument from reciprocity and from reciprocity he was able to derive fair play from it.

In chapter five he goes on to defend fair play from three objections. He concludes by saying, “reciprocity and fairness to them place us, other things being equal, under a general obligation to obey the laws.”(79) Fair play according to Dagger is a cooperative practice within a political society, it is not absolute and can be overridden, and this obligation is not the law. I will be interested to see how he attempts to continue to tie autonomy and civic virtue together, namely, how he will be able to get people to cooperate within republican liberalism and put aside their personal interests for the community as a whole, when required to do so.
Dagger first argues that reciprocity connects the concept of autonomy to community (principle of fair play). The distinction Sandel seems to draw between his position and others is the attitude towards obligation and coercion; does one need to be coerced? Does one do it for self-interest? Or, like the communitarian, does one cooperate due to the feeling they get from being apart of that community?

Dagger raises an interesting question of how much sacrifice is too much. The one argument I'm not compelled by is his claim that because some communities are bad all must be. Why can't the communitarian apply other conditions to judge communities by much as he draws distinctions between the validity of different kinds of rights?

I enjoyed the second article, but I'd be interested in hearing how he'd respond to someone like Thoreau. I also think its interesting they didnt spend more time talking about what a "general" obligation to follow the law consists of. If any process of reasoning can override that duty, doesn't that deny the existence of that duty? I'm not sure I was convinced of any duty in his argument; that probably means I missed something .

priority to fellow citizens

The question in chapter 4 is whether or not our autonomy will get in the way of our equally important bond with our society. THe reason Dagger brings this up is he points out that we tend to place a high importance on somethings and then shun and down play other things that may very well be equally important. So in looking at this he wants to see how autonomy may effect community unity. We first run into the issue of what we hold as a criteria for our community. He wants to not really deal with this argument because of its complexity so he starts with saying that we are just dealing with people that we agree share citizenship with us. How does this bond of citizenship effect our stance on human rights with autonomy as the base is then turned into the question of whether it makes sense to put any special weight on our community over others. Dagger looks at several ways that fail to come to the conclusion that the only way to look at this bond and still hold that our community has more weight than others is to view our relationship as a citizen in a way that is consistent with social contract theory. Social contract theory says that society is viewed in a way as having each citizen in a freely agreed upon bond that explains the obligations and rewards we have in society. With this in mind this can mean that when looking to see where to propagate autonomy and other rights that we should first look to our society all things being equal because we must contribute to the benefit of public goods in our society in exchange for the rewards we receive through being a member.