MacDonald's Essay

MacDonald points out that throughout history, regardless of particular political creed (except, of course, in tyrannical or fascist governments, &c), we find appeals to the equality of man (an equality which is untempered by asterisks and qualifiers). This is often based on some sort of essential human nature which the Greeks (Aristotle) tell us is reason, or the capacity for abstraction. Thus, MacDonald explains, many philosophers have claimed that the human capacity for reason is the grounding for our natural rights/natural law. MacDonald goes on to assert, however, that the capacity for reason varies from person to person, and that the lack of reason does not mean that these individuals lack natural rights. So, if it isn't the capacity for reason, what is it? Here I felt like I ended up stumbling around a bit, fumbling in the dark. I read her as saying that humanity, without any qualifiers, gives us natural rights, almost as if she was saying that natural rights are wrapped up in the very fabric/essence of our humanity (and I suppose I am taking part in a tautology, but it still seems very complicated to me). She looks at human difference, and she asks, "But where in this variety are we to find the constant factor by which to determine human rights? What passport will admit to the Kingdom of Ends?" (29). She goes on to say that "nature provides no standards or ideals" (30). Which is to say, there is nothing we are meant to do, nothing for which we are designed, no end, no ultimate purpose. Humanity constructs standards through choices (and politics). MacDonald finally raises the point that we are social creatures, and this was where I felt we might have come up with a grounding for so-called natural rights. If all natural rights (and civil rights, though MacDonald points out that natural rights tend to be political in character) are about human interactions with one another, are simply about our social nature, can this not be our grounding? Because human beings exist in societies, these are rights that they have? Or is this still an appeal to utilitarianism and other groundings/arguments simply in new clothing?
I struggled with this, and then went back and reread the end of the essay.
She moves on to a discussion of assertions, of values. I was struck by a passage at the bottom of page 39: "For there are no true or false beliefs about values, but only better or worse decisions and choices. And to encourage the better decisions we need to employ devices which are artistic rather than scientific. For our aim is not intellectual assent, but practical effects" (40). So, does this mean that a discussion of natural rights, for all intents and purposes, is merely about having the right effects? And if so, do we only use the natural rights arguments because they tend to be successful (which, actually, they haven't been)? Are there really natural rights at all according to MacDonald? Because by the end I thought her answer was "no" but my classmates' posts have made me question my reading.