Vlastos

I think that Prof. McCrickerd's response to Mike pretty well sums up the article; I only have a few comments as of now.

1.) I'm not convinced entirely by his argument on 55 that our moral responses are independent of the merit of another. Do we really feel it to be true that we ought to save a man from drowning regardless of his moral merit? Dahmer? Hitler? It sounds callous, but I'm not sure I believe that moral obligations are completely seperable from merit. Perhaps another example: Am I obligated to recognize the right to freedom of movement to someone who has been convicted of murder? This seems to be a discussion of character. Then again, his argument for why natural rights can be overridden could explain this away.

2.) What is the larger take home point? I understand that it justifies overriding equality based on merit, but what other situations would this apply to? He talks about how it might apply to the economic and political sphere. In what ways?

3.) I think perhaps most important is what he points out on page 74. Recognizing where distinctions are justifies also helps us figure out when they are not. Merit and human worth are two distinct concepts. Inequal action based on merit does not justify claiming inequality in human worth.