Wednesday, February 11, 2009

Are there any natural rights?- Hart

In her discussion of the connection between moral and legal rights, Hart states that, “the most important common characteristic of this group of moral concepts [i.e. justice, fairness, rights, and obligation] is that there is no incongruity, but a special congruity in the use of force or the threat of force to secure that what is just or fair or someone’s rights to be done shall in fact be done; or it is in just these circumstances that coercion of another human being is legitimate” (p.80). I understand Hart’s discussion of special rights and moral justification, but I don’t understand this quote. How is it that moral concepts such as justice and fairness allow the use of force or the threat of force to attain said concepts? Perhaps Hart is using force to signify legal measures, but if the word force is being used with the connotation that I am understanding, I am not sure that I agree with that statement.

Secondly, I agree with her that moral rights and duties need not necessarily be correlative and that it is important to differentiate between a right and between codes of behavior that merely prescribe actions. Perhaps the lack of this differentiation is what is contributing to the proliferation of rights that Wellman discusses.

1 comment:

  1. I agree with you that there might be a correlation between our inability to differentiate between a right and behavioral codes and Wellman's proliferation of rights. It seems like one of Wellman's main arguments for the proliferation of rights was the vast quantity of alleged moral rights. Are those alleged moral rights the same as an illusory connection between a right and a behavioral code?

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