Glendon continues a theme we found in Wellman. One might think, "what is the harm of having too many rights? Sure, some of them might be superfluous. Why not err on the side of caution?" The first problem is absolutism, as shown in chapter two. Rights are not absolute, and it would be difficult to argue that a lot of rights we have are objectively and unchallengeable. Private property is a great example--a long time ago it was written about as if it was a natural, god given right; now, its taken for granted by everyone and leads to disastrous consequences. Of course, the way that rights can be manipulated allows certain rights to be more objective and concrete for certain people.

This is hinted at in chapter one (and perhaps is discussed in more detail later) but rights tend to prevent discussion. Instead of reasoning out what might be the best or most fair result, we default to rights language without having an actual discussion. This problem is demonstrated when Glendon discusses gives the example of people reaching for rights alanguage when backed into a corner.

I think this article goes very well with Raz's. Raz talks about the limited ability for a rights language to capture everything we want with morality. Glendon discusses how rights tend to prevent real discussion and give us everything we need in terms of...well, what is right. Neither wants to throw rights out the window; it seems, to the contrary, that both want rights to play their role as part of a larger system. I'll be interested in seeing what sort of vision Glendon has at the end of the book.

As a note, I find it repugnant the extent to which we associate private property and liberty.