Monday, March 2, 2009

Dworkin and his Utilitarianism

I can see that Dworkin is defending utilitarianism. Dworkin describes an interesting scenario:
“If the constitution sets out a version of utilitarianism which provides in terms that Sarah’s preferences are to count for twice as much as those of others, then this would be unacceptable, non-egalitarian version of utilitarianism. But now suppose that the constitutional provision is the standard form of utilitarianism, that is, that it is neutral towards all people and preferences” (155).
This scenario suggest and Dworkin mention in the previous page that he is interested in defending the standard form of utilitarianism rather than defend a version of utilitarianism, such as rule utilitarianism or actual utilitarianism. I think he argues that under the utilitarianism, people do have right because the government views and treats everyone equally. It is good for a society that people have rights. And it is under extreme circumstance that peoples’ right are infringed for the good of the whole. Of course, he also argues that there should be very good reason too.

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