Tuesday, March 3, 2009

"Rights as Trumps" - Dworkin

Mike, I agree, this was an enjoyable, more understanding read for me, as well.

Here is how I break his argument down, in particular with the Nazi example: Dworkin states that the "most fundamental tenet" of utilitarianism, is "that people's preferences should be weighed on an equal basis in the same scales" (156). [Because of that fundamental tenet of the theory itself, the goal of utilitarianism, in consistency with its appeal to egalitarianism, then is to not have some people's preferences count for more than other people's preferences.] On the next page, he goes on to say in the second paragraph that utilitarianism cannot simultaneously accept (1)not agreeing with the idea that some people's preferences should count for more than other people's; while (2)fulfilling the political preferences of those who accept that some people's preferences should count for more than other people's. Because it cannot accommodate number 2 above while at the same time fulfilling the fundamental tenet of the theory in number 1 above, it cannot agree with Nazi political preferences, which rest on the belief that some people's (i.e. Aryans') preferences should count for more than other people's (i.e. Jews). Because if it were to agree with Nazi's, it would disagree with its fundamental tenet of egalitarianism.

With this understanding, I can see, then, Erma why you would be struggling with Dworkin's defense of the claim that utilitarians need not or should not take all preferences into account. He defends this by arguing that this sort of restriction on certain preferences can be achieved by (1) adopting a right to political independence and (2) adopting a right to moral independence. The way that he defines each is essential to the theory's egalitarian consistency. Political independence is defined as "the right that no one suffer disadvantage in the distribution of goods or opportunities on the ground that others think he should have less because of who he is or is not, or that others care less for him than they do or other people" (158). He states that moral independence can be similarly defended. He argues that if utilitarianism rejects that some people's beliefs or conceptions are "inherently degrading," then it cannot take the moral preferences of people who hold such beliefs or conceptions as a justification in restricting their rights (158).

On a final note here, Ernie you raise a really interesting question about comparing different theories of rights. I clearly don't have a concise answer on this one, but my initial presumption is that which ever rights our society wants realized, it really need not matter which particular theory is "correct," as long as those rights are realized in the end, or as long as we are able to convince other people that we believe that right should be realized, the means may not necessarily be as important as the end result. Secondly, as far as other concrete examples that would align with Dworkin's reasoning, one that comes to mind and which (I think) is consistent with his argument is homosexuality (specifically referring to his discussion on moral independence, which I refer to in the paragraph above). I think that other rights that would be included are those which ought to be realized independently of whether or not they are convenient for a society, as long as there are justified grounds for such rights.

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