Right-Based Moralities

I really like this article because after Raz makes a point, he explains himself afterwards to make sure that I understood it the way he was trying to say it. In the beginning he talks about what other philosophers have said about rights and duties; focusing a lot on Dworkin. He then goes on to prove "right-based moralities are impoverished moral theories and are unlikely to provide adequate foundation for an acceptable humanistic morality" (183). I understand this to mean that right based moralities do not provide enough to be an acceptable morality as defined by humanists. He says that the way rights are perceived by utilitarians are very individualistic even though they might be trying to steer clear from that. He gives three examples as to why right-based moralities can be impoverished; 1) he shows the difference between what one ought to do and what one's duty is; 2) that they don't allow the moral significance of supererogation (beyond requirements of duties); 3) they can't allow intrinsic moral value (184-185). After that he begins to describe what he thinks is the best way to understand right-based moralities.
This is about all the farther that I got; I will try to finish the rest an bring questions to class tomorrow morning.