Wednesday, March 4, 2009

Mackie

Overall, I enjoyed Mackie’s argument, and I’m interested in seeing the other side for Tuesday. With that in mind, I think I’m missing a big piece of the larger puzzle he is trying to construct. He says: “When we think it out, therefore, we see that not only can there be a right-based moral theory, there cannot be an acceptable moral theory that is not right-based” (176). After reading his lengthy critique of utilitarianism, I think I have a decent grasp on the first part of the statement (that such a theory can exist), but I’m not sure how he makes the leap to the second clause; in other words, why must an acceptable moral theory be rights-based?

Second, his fundamental right (the “right to certain opportunities of living”) is, in his own words, “somewhat indeterminate” (178). My issue with this right is the opposite of the problem I had with Gewirth’s right of a mother not to be tortured by her son. While I thought Gewirth’s right was too specific, I feel that Mackie’s is too generic. While I agree that such a right does exist, I’m thinking that such a right is so broad that it may lack any substance; if it lacks substance, I’m wondering what real purpose it would serve. In other words, I’m wondering what “certain opportunities” means (and who defines what those opportunities are). I understand that he says that such a theory has not been fully explored, but I feel that, by making such a generic fundamental right, he may be setting up a straw man argument. After all, in the absence of a firm definition of “certain opportunities,” I think it may be hard to deny the existence of such a universal right (or, on the contrary, maybe that just means that Mackie did a good job).

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