Monday, March 9, 2009

Right-Based Moralities - Raz

I understand Raz's argument about right-based moralities being "impoverished." The second part of the argument, about why such impoverishment leads to moral loss, was a little less clear for me, but what I took away from it is what he states on page 195, "There are fundamental moral duties which do not derive solely from the rights and interests of their potential beneficiaries or which have no potential beneficiaries at all." A rights based approach is not enough to cover our notions of morality. There are things which we hold intrinsically valuable for which a rights-based approach cannot account.

I think the overall argument is that if we believe that collective goods are valuable in themselves, then "it is to be expected that they provide the source both of personal goals and of obligations to others" (200). I understand that as saying that we need more than one approach if we want to cover not only individualistic values but also collective ones, which is what I've been thinking all along by saying that just because one theory may not necessarily account for our notions of morality or moral rights, it should not discourage us because as long as we are able to articulate the legitimacy of moral rights, singling out which theory is more important may not be as big of a concern.

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