Dagger Re-visited

Hopefully I can address some of the issues I failed to in class. However, I want to first clarify that I do not necessarily believe the arguments I'm going to present--I just think that Dagger doesn't address them sufficiently.

First, I turn to the issue of legal status of citizenship as discussed today in class. Many people seemed to want to argue that Dagger was insisting on the social aspect of citizenship, especially relating to the role of a citizen in his/her community. On page 99, though, Dagger affirms that citizenship as a matter of legal status is necessary to his concept of republican liberalism (or, in other words, the legal and social can't necessarily be separated in terms of citizenship). He also affirms that citizenship can simply be a matter of legal status and nothing more. This latter point is the one I was aiming at in my previous post.

Unfortunately for my argument, there are many compelling aspects to Dagger's republican liberalism. If we accept Dagger's republican liberalism claim, though, problems quickly arise. These problems are some, but certainly not all, of the arguments conceivable against republican liberalism's concept, especially regarding the legal status vs. social status of citizenship.

First, consider Dagger's requirements for a true and real citizen: "A true citizen will take an active part in public life, and this activity must involve more than an occasional trip to the polling place." (p. 100) and "For a republican liberal, however, the real citizen is one who acts with the common good in mind." (p. 100) We can also look at page 101 of Dagger, where he says: "Citizenship thus requires that we think of ourselves as something more than the sum of the roles we play." It would logically follow, then, that Dagger is arguing increased activity/involvement makes people better citizens, or at least means they better fulfill the role of citizenry. While on the surface this argument seems sound on the surface, a focused examination reveals several weaknesses. One specific example that would undermine Dagger's view is looking at Nazi Germany and its citizenry. German citizens who actively participated in the Nazi regime, under Dagger's view of participation in multiple facets for the societal consensus of good, were arguably fulfilling their citizenship requirement at that time in Germany. However, I think very few people today would argue that those citizens were acting in a way that correlates with "true citizenship," but doesn't that only prove the term "citizenship" is subjective? Those citizens clearly believed they were acting as citizens should to benefit the greater good of the society they envisioned. This subjectivity which republican liberalism would seem to encourage can be avoided with accepting citizenship as simply a legal status instead of an integration of legal and social statuses.

My second criticism of Dagger deals with the existence of choice as citizens. If we are supposed to have an obligation to others in our community within our role as citizens, why is the choice to not participate in our community included, whether legally or as a social standard? Some may argue the ability to not participate stems from some idea of the natural right to choose or that it is in line with democracy to not be forced to do/believe certain things. However, I offer a different view: we are given the choice to not participate because, on occasion, not participating is itself a form of democratic participation/citizenship. For example, look at countries in Africa or the country of Venezuela where elections have been flawed by cheating on the part of the current ruling power (individual or group). If we consider that large collectives in these countries have refused to follow government action by not voting nor following government action, few would argue those collectives are acting in violation of their role as citizen. However, at the same time, abstaining from active participation seems to contradict Dagger's view.

I admit that I could quite easily be missing some of Dagger's argument in trying to flush out my arguments, but I hope people reading this will at least contemplate/build upon the arguments I'm trying to present here. Although I would argue Dagger's idea of citizenship through republican liberalism is insufficient due to the problems explained above (as well as those not mentioned or thought of by this author), I have not taken the time to examine how the legal status of citizenship would be able to stand on its own. The only thing that jumps to mind is the level of objectivity a legal status entails, compared to the subjective use of the term citizenship which republican liberalism requires.