Sunday, April 26, 2009

Pogge's conceptions of human rights

Pogge really likes to use numbered lists. It seems like there are “four reasons” for everything and that each of those reasons is subdivided into its own finite list of reasons. I really like this writing style; it makes it much easier for me to stop and check my understanding.

With that said, I have a number of questions about these chapters, so I’ll jump right in.

1. Why are manifesto rights necessarily inferior rights? Pogge says that these “rhgts are somehow unrealistic or unclear about the duties they entail,” but it seems to me that many of these human rights that we are discussing in this book are will be extremely difficult to fully realize; if this is true, then some may label proponents of those rights “unrealistic” (73). As such, I’m wondering why such “unrealistic” rights are seemingly discounted. Is it just practicality, or am I missing something deeper?
2. I do like Pogge’s distinction between an interactional and institutional understanding of human rights (71). Although I’m wondering how much radical change is necessary to fully realize a system of institutional human rights. I like Pogge’s use of this concept because I’m inclined to believe that institutions are closer to the root cause of these problems; thus, it makes sense to target institutions as the way to fix the problem. I also think such a conception of human rights decentralizes responsibility to the public rather than centralizing that responsibility on government elites. However, I’m wondering if there is a tradeoff between these two conceptions of human rights? What is lost/gained with each conception of human rights?

1 comment:

  1. Regarding (1) manifesto rights are typically viewed as 'aspirational' and, thus, not a significant flaw if a state fails to protect them; (2) I think that the shift to institutional rights really changes the duties of the particular citizens.

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