Pogge on human rights

I found it interesting that Pogge draws a distinction between legal human rights and moral human rights, mainly because I have not heard or thought of this distinction before. He draws on this distinction to discuss how human rights should be conceived and what they assert, particularly in relation to correlative responsibilities. “The fact that some formulated right has all the conceptual features of a human right does not entail that it exists (can be justified as such)…” (59) and this is where the moral arguments are important. His distinction also becomes important when he points out the contradictions within our system of human rights laws. He provides this example, “…a government may legally bind itself never to violate human rights and yet do nothing or very little to ensure that its various agencies and officers abide by this official prohibition” (66). This means that governments cannot be solely responsible for legal human rights, but that a conception of a moral right is important because “While the government may, then, be the primary guardian of human rights and the prime measure of official disrespect, the people are their ultimate guardian on whom their realization crucially depends” (69). Therefore, the attitude of the people plays a large role in guarding human rights. This part of Pogge’s argument is similar to Dagger’s, in that, citizens need to be actively engaged in political life to preserve these rights. This ‘interactional’ conception is similar to Dagger’s argument of civic virtue and involved citizens.