Wednesday, April 1, 2009

Glendon 5-7

Throughout chapter 7, Glendon offers a strident critique of rights discourse; what she has said throughout previous chapters of the book comes together to formulate a rather stark picture of rights discourse in America today. For example, she argues that “rights talk in its current form… is turning American political discourse into a parody of itself” (171). Whenever I read such harsh critiques of some topic, I’m always interested to see what suggestions for improvement the author can provide. So, here we go.
Particularly, she argues that “the greatest hope for renewal, perhaps, lies in the American political tradition itself, in its time-honored ideals of tolerance, respect for others, public deliberation, individual freedom and responsibility, and the mandate for self-restraint implicit in the rule of law” (176). I’m skeptical here. This seems to be a very idealistic view of American society. Of course, I think we would like to have these “time-honored ideals,” but, thinking back to the 2008 election, I’m not sure that I saw many of them in practice. Do we still think these things are valuable as a country? If so, how are we working toward them?
Particularly, Glendon singles out two groups as particularly important to widespread change; Glendon writes about the Supreme Court and grassroots advocates. First, Glendon says that grassroots activisits can bring change from the ground up by looking for areas of consensus among individuals at the local level; from here, it seems, Glendon thinks that rights talk could gradually be changed. Second, Glendon argues that the Supreme Court has relaxed its hold on many issues that it has prevented the popularly elected branches from discussing. While a great deal of political science scholarship has noted a change in the types of issues that the Court addresses over time, I don’t think that they are ever really preventing other branches to act; in fact, Congress routinely overrides or refuses to follow the directives of the Court on statutory matters, and it has often found ways around constitutional rulings, as well. I think that Glendon would be better off if she shifted her eyes away from the Court and moved them to Congress (the branch that was designed to be the most powerful). Regardless of what one thinks about the Court’s power, I think few would argue that Congress is a great deal weaker than the Court. After all, the Court is a necessarily reactive institution (it can only respond to those cases which are contained in appeals it receives) whereas Congress can be proactive and choose to work on particular issues.
All in all, I’m wondering where we sit after reading Glendon. She offers such a harsh critique of the way in which we invoke rights that it seems we are in a place from which we may never recover. Do we think her solutions are adequate? Are there other solutions she does not consider? Or, are we “doomed” to continue with this type of rights discourse forever?

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