Prolif. of Rights Ch. 4

For me, the most interesting passage in the chapter was the following:

"It is not merely legal rights that have their limits in the struggle for an idealth society; moral rights also have limited applicability. There is more to morality than rights" (94).

I've heard a little about the ethics of care but I'd be interested in learning more. It seems like a fairly intuitive concept--separating morality from emotion (which, I presume to be at least partially the basis of care) might be a misstep. What other factors might be needed to fully encompass all aspects of morality?

A problem with equal pay and the problem of affirmative action are intertwined. On the one hand, it is clear that African-Americans are denied opportunities in higher education partially because their relatives were denied those same opportunities. If they are then denied opportunities, the cycle continues. Yet, we are not comfortable with affirmative action because it denies an opportunity granted to someone else. It is clear that merely granting equal pay to women is not sufficient for rectifying inequality between the sexes, primarily because they are stuck in jobs that are not recognize as important. One answer would be assimilation--to enter the jobs that men currently primarily hold. Presuming this is a desirable option (a debateable point) women face severe entrance barriers, even assuming they come from well off families. Lack of other women in their profession, bias (largely from older generations) and other issues create detrimental work environments. How is this problem rectified? Placing more women in the workplace? Or do we start paying positions that women tend to hold (eg teaching) more? Who does this and where do we take away money from? As Wellman describes, comparing different jobs can be a terribly difficult task--yet not doing so and leaving it in the hands of the market it equally troubling.

The arguments on p. 79 are also of particular interest. It is clear to me that discrimination--used without negative connotations--might be necessary in order to capture the essence of rights distinctly needed by women. In law, though, there is a very thin line between warranted and unwarranted discrimination. How can courts construct laws so as to determine and then maintain such a line?

I also think its telling the way we default to rights language when attempting to express something we are passionate about (85). It shows just how valuable this language in and thereby the extent to which it needs to be limited to maintain its effectiveness. I am compelled by the standards Wellman gives for both legal and moral rights at the end of chapter three and would like to explore the legitimacy of these further.