One of the things that particularly grabbed my attention in the readings of Chapter 2 and 3 is Wellman's argument that groups cannot have moral rights. He states, "Because I believe that groups, including peoples, are incapable of acting collectively, I deny that a people as such could have any moral rights" (p. 35).

I can't bring myself to agree with the idea of groups not having moral rights. Some of the previous posts include the argument that third generation rights are not necessary because such rights are already accounted for by first generation rights. However, I think that first generation rights and third generation rights are each important in their own sense, because both individual and collective rights are necessary for the full realization of human rights.

If collective rights are those claimed by human beings as part of groups, they are not necessarily in tension with individual rights. I also don't think that it is a safe assumption that individual rights are able to replace collective rights. I think the question should not be which are more important, but rather, how best to promote both so as to attain a full meaning of human rights.

In order to understand the importance of third generation rights, it is necessary to understand the context under which such rights arose. Third generation rights arose in international law in the aftermath of World War I, but I think became even more prominent after World War II and decolonization. The importance of third generation rights is illustrated through the concept of genocide, as Wellman points out. Prior to the acceptance of the term "genocide" after WWII, the act of what we now know to be "genocide" was, in the words of Winston Churchill, "a crime without a name". If such a crime had remained without a name, and if this collective human right from genocide was not brought into international discourse, the crimes in Yugoslavia or the crimes against Jews by Nazis may not have ever been brought before the international agenda and the crimes committed may have remained unrecognized if we solely depended on first generation rights. Because the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted in a historical context motivated by the crimes during WWII, Wellman states that, "Presumably, then, the peoples' right to existence concerns its physical existence rather than its cultural identity" (p. 31). But doesn't the annihilation of a group also destroy that group's cultural identity, therefore making the right to existence not only a matter of physical existence, but also one of cultural identity? Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term "genocide" was concerned with nationality and ethnicity because they are components of a culture. "He thought that each cultural group had its own 'genius' that should be preserved. To destroy, or attempt to destroy, a culture, is a special kind of crime because culture is the unit of collective memory...To kill a culture is to cast its individual members into individual oblivion, their memories buried with their mortal remains" (Jones, Adam. Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction. Routledge, 2006.11.). Therefore, the importance of the term "genocide" is not only the recognition that groups of people are destroyed, but also that with those groups, their cultural identities are destroyed, as well.

Even though third generation rights may reinforce certain first generation rights (i.e. the protection against the annihilation of a group reinforces the individual human right of life), the third generation rights are still important in themselves because first generation rights are inadequate in protecting the collective rights of a group. The sole right to life does not encompass a broader concept such as genocide. That not only highlights the importance of third-generation rights, but also makes one question how someone can claim that groups do not possess moral rights? If a group is destroyed, individuals are also killed, and does that not in turn violate the moral rights of individuals? Furthermore, if groups are compromised of individuals, and individuals possess moral rights (if they, in fact, do), then doesn't the group, as a whole, share certain moral rights by virtue of being comprised by individuals?