Wellman Chapter 1

In class we discussed the idea of moral rights existence very briefly, and Wellman refers to these rights as "alleged moral rights." Moral rights exist. The problem with moral rights are that they are relative to our own experiences and only those experiences. They are not merely a product of socialization. For example, if you look at a hypothetical situation where a man or woman is able to successfully grow and develop (on their own) in a setting away from "civilization," that person will still develop concepts like the right to life (which is the product of survival instinct). This person will also decide they have a moral right to food, water, and shelter. Socialization can also foster rights, but I think it is important to draw the distinction that human rights are not subject only to our existence as humans in a society. Wellman's wording doesn't suggest he refutes the claim of moral rights, but it seems he does question a primary premise of moral rights: because the rights are relative to each individual, the rights are significant regardless of the number of or claims of rights. People will and must be able to determine their own concepts of moral rights in whatever manner they choose (in other words, the determination of rights does not always occur through concepts of liberty, claim, power, etc. because these principles are not present in all societies for all individuals).

As discussed by Wellman, legality serves as a strainer to the mass number of purported moral rights. Laws, which ALL have some basis in moral rights, are a means to selecting the most acceptable rights within a society. The problem here, though, is that law itself is relative and highly subjective (despite a goal of objectivity). As to the relativity, compare the U.S. legal code with that of any theocracy, such as Iran or during the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The laws in those theocracies concerning women were highly relative to the religious concepts integrated in those country's governments. As to subjective laws, the result of this is simple-it is near, if not completely, impossible to create a law with no room for various interpretation. Because of this wiggle room in interpretation, the rights which are made uniform in society through law can often be misconstrued.

I'd also like to address Jasmine's entry specifically about the obtainment of rights. For example, I do not think humans derive the right to survive from social norms (as illustrated in my first paragraph). We certainly are not able to cognitively recognize all of our rights in earlier stages of life, both due to a lack of experiences and cognitive development, but there ARE some absolute rights. Again, the problem comes in the articulation of the rights (same problem with any issue of defining something in words), but a lack of articulation does not mean a lack of existence.